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Abstract
Multifunctional agriculture refers to the fact that agriculture produces jointly a
number of commodity and non-commodity outputs, and some of these non-
commodity outputs exhibit the characteristics of externalities and public goods.
Thus, multifunctionality provides an integrated framework for the simultaneous
consideration of multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs.
Multifunctionality constitutes a complex problem from the perspective of
policy design and implementation. Finding out the socially optimal bundle of
multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs involves the identification of
the important outputs as well as their relative significance, and policies
conducive to multifunctional agriculture must simultaneously address several
outputs, commodity and non-commodity ones. Moreover, the heterogeneous
conditions under which agriculture operates create a spatial dimension in the
supply of commodity and non-commodity outputs. That is, there are spatial
differences in productivity and, hence, in the production costs of commodity
and non-commodity outputs. Finally, there are trade-offs between the precision
of the policy instruments and their information requirements and related
administrative costs.
The main objective of the present study was to contribute to the understanding
of the implications of multifunctionality for effective agri-environmental policy
design. The main research question addressed was the performance of various
types of policy interventions in achieving the optimal bundle of multifunctional
outputs under heterogeneous conditions.
The scope of the present study was restricted to the environmental dimension
of multifunctionality. Two commodity outputs and three environmental non-
commodity outputs (nutrient runoffs, landscape diversity, and agrobiodiversity)
were analysed, taking into account jointness and heterogeneity in their supply
and the externality and public good aspects in their demand.
In this study an analytical model was developed, and then empirical results
were obtained by calibrating the model to Finnish data. First, the farmer's
private optimum was compared to the social optimum where nutrient runoffs,
landscape diversity, and agrobiodiversity were valued at their social marginal
values. Next, solutions were developed for the first-best differentiated policy
instruments and the second-best uniform and semi-uniform policy instruments.4
Finally, farm income support measures and environmental cross-compliance
schemes were analysed.
The study brings out how the design of agri-environmental policies against the
background of multifunctionality differs from the individual treatment of the
various environmental effects of agriculture. Because of the joint production
process, the levels of different multifunctional outputs are linked to each other.
Hence, the regulation of one environmental effect necessarily influences the
other environmental effects and agricultural production, as well as other
dimensions of multifunctionality. These interactions need to be accounted for
when designing policies inducive to multifunctionality.
It was shown that the optimal policy with respect to multifunctional agriculture
under heterogeneous land quality is to use the combination of a differentiated
fertilizer tax and a differentiated buffer strip subsidy. The requirement for the
use of differentiated instruments arises from the fact that the non-commodity
outputs indirectly depend on the heterogeneous land quality through the size
of the buffer strips and the amount of fertilizer used. Thus, the first-best
solution requires that policy instruments vary over land quality and crop
because non-commodity outputs do so. The social welfare difference between
the first-best differentiated instruments and the second-best uniform instruments
is FIM 64 (10.8 €) per hectare in the case of semi-uniform instruments (crop-
specific but uniform with respect to land quality) and FIM 116 (19.5 €) per
hectare in the case of fully uniform instruments. Regarding farm income
support measures, the results show that pure acreage subsidy and pure producer
price support perform poorly in promoting the environmental elements of
multifunctional agriculture. However, the performance of these income support
measures could be greatly improved by incorporating some environmental
cross-compliance mechanisms into them.
To sum up, the combination of differentiated policy instruments is needed to
secure the production of the optimal bundle of multifunctional outputs under
heterogeneous conditions.
Index words: Agrobiodiversity, buffer strip, heterogeneity, landscape mosaic,
land quality, nutrient runoffs5
Ympäristöllinen monivaikutteisuus:
Taloudellinen analyysi ja merkitys
politiikan suunnittelulle
Jussi Lankoski
MTT Taloustutkimus, Luutnantintie 13, 00410 Helsinki, jussi.lankoski@mtt.fi
Tiivistelmä
Käsitteellä monivaikutteinen maatalous viitataan siihen, että maatalous ruoan-
ja kuiduntuotannon lisäksi tuottaa muitakin yhteiskunnan hyvinvointiin vai-
kuttavia maaseutu- ja ympäristöhyödykkeitä. Tärkeimpiä monivaikutteisuuden
ulottuvuuksia ovat ympäristön laatu, elintarvikkeiden huoltovarmuus ja maa-
seudun sosioekonominen elinvoimaisuus. Määritelmällisesti monivaikutteisuus-
tuotosten tulisi syntyä yhteistuotosprosessissa varsinaisen tuotannon yhtey-
dessä ja olla luonteeltaan selvästi ulkoisvaikutuksia ja julkishyödykkeitä.
Monivaikutteisuus tarjoaa haastavan ongelman politiikan suunnitteluun ja
toimeenpanoon. Etsittäessä optimaalista monivaikutteisuustuotosten kokonai-
suutta on pystyttävä tarkastelemaan samanaikaisesti sekä varsinaista maatalous-
tuotantoa että monivaikutteisuuden muita ulottuvuuksia. Tarkastelua vaikeut-
tavat vielä ulottuvuuksien riippuvuus toisistaan yhteistuotosprosessin kautta,
maataloudelle tyypilliset heterogeeniset tuotanto-olosuhteet ja toimivien mark-
kinoiden puuttuminen useilta monivaikutteisuustuotoksilta.
Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on lisätä tietoa monivaikutteisuuden merki-
tyksestä maatalouspolitiikan ja maatalouden ympäristöpolitiikan suunnittelus-
sa. Keskeisenä tutkimusongelmana on erilaisten politiikkatoimenpiteiden kyky
saavuttaa yhteiskunnallisesti optimaalinen maatalouden monivaikutteisuus
heterogeenisissä olosuhteissa. Tutkimus on rajattu monivaikutteisuuden ympä-
ristölliseen ulottuvuuteen ja siinä analysoidaan kahden viljelykasvin ja kolmen
ympäristöhyödykkeen yhteistuotosprosessia peltoekosysteemissä. Analysoitavat
ympäristöhyödykkeet ovat agrobiodiversiteetti, maaseutumaiseman monimuo-
toisuus ja ravinnepäästöt.
Tutkimuksessa on ensimmäisen kerran kehitetty sekä analyyttinen että empii-
rinen malli, joka tarjoaa integroidun viitekehyksen monivaikutteisuuden ulot-
tuvuuksien tarkastelulle. Aluksi johdetaan edustavan viljelijän yksityinen optimi
ja verrataan sitä yhteiskunnalliseen optimiin, jossa ympäristöhyödykkeitä ar-
vostetaan niiden yhteiskunnallisten rajahaittojen ja rajahyötyjen mukaisesti.
Seuraavaksi analysoidaan kolmentyyppisiä politiikkatoimenpiteitä: (i) first-
best eli lohko- ja kasvikohtaisesti erilaistetut lannoitevero ja suojakaistatuki,
(ii) second-best eli osittain (vain kasvikohtaisesti) erilaistetut tai kokonaan
erilaistamattomat politiikkatoimenpiteet ja (iii) käytännön politiikkatoimenpiteet
eli perinteiset maatalouspolitiikan tulotukimudot kuten hintatuki ja hehtaari-
tuki sekä tulotuet, joihin on liitetty ympäristökriteerejä tulotuen saannin6
ehdoiksi. Empiiriset tulokset saadaan kalibroimalla analyyttinen malli suoma-
laiseen havaintoaineistoon.
Tutkimus tuo esiin sen, kuinka maatalouden ympäristöpolitiikan suunnittelu
monivaikutteisuuden viitekehyksestä käsin poikkeaa maatalouden ympäristö-
asioiden yksittäisestä tarkastelusta. Yhteistuotosprosessin vuoksi eri monivaikut-
teisuustuotosten tuotannon taso on kytköksissä toisiinsa. Tämän seurauksena
yhden ympäristöhyödyn tai -haitan sääntely aiheuttaa väistämättä muutoksia
niin muissa ympäristöhyödykkeissä ja itse maataloustuotteiden tuotannossa
kuin muissa monivaikutteisuuden ulottuvuuksissakin. Yhteiskunnallisesti opti-
maalisen monivaikutteisuuspolitiikan lähtökohdaksi tulevatkin räätälöidyt
politiikkatoimenpideyhdistelmät, joissa toimenpiteiden taso asetetaan koordi-
noidusti.
Tutkimuksen tuloksena on myös, että heterogeeniset olosuhteet vaativat hete-
rogeenisen sääntelyn. Kun viljelysmaan laatu vaihtelee siten, että se vaikuttaa
sekä viljelykasvien että ympäristöhyödykkeiden tuotantoon, yhteiskunnan näkö-
kulmasta optimaalinen monivaikutteisuuspolitiikka on erilaistaa politiikka-
toimenpiteiden taso heijastamaan näitä heterogeenisiä olosuhteita. Käytän-
nössä tämä merkitsee lohko- ja kasvikohtaisesti erilaistettuja toimenpiteitä.
Mikäli politiikkatoimenpiteet on erilaistettu vain osittain tai ei lainkaan, yhteis-
kunnallisesti optimaalista monivaikutteisuustuotosten määrää ei saavuteta. Tut-
kimuksen empiirisessä aineistossa tämä yhteiskunnan hyvinvointitappio epätar-
kempien ohjauskeinojen käyttämisestä oli 64 mk/ha (10,76 €/ha) kasvikohtai-
sesti erilaistetuilla toimenpiteillä ja 116 mk/ha (19,51€/ha) kokonaan erilaista-
mattomilla toimenpiteillä. Epätarkemmista toimenpiteistä koituva hyvinvointi-
tappio on kuitenkin suhteutettava erilaistettujen politiikkatoimien vaatimiin
suuriin hallinnointikustannuksiin.
Lisäksi tutkimus osoittaa, että sekä puhdas hintatuki että hehtaarituki kuten
CAP-kompensaatiotuki eivät edistä monivaikutteisuuden ympäristöllistä ulot-
tuvuutta. Näiden toimenpiteiden kykyä ottaa monivaikutteisuus huomioon ja
edistää sitä voidaan kuitenkin merkittävästi parantaa liittämällä niihin ympä-
ristöehtoja.
Asiasanat: Biologinen monimuotoisuus, heterogeenisyys, maaseutumaisema,
ravinnepäästöt, suojakaista, viljelysmaan laatu7
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
For some time it has been recognised that, besides the production of food and
fibre, agriculture has other functions through which it contributes to social
welfare. Jointly with the production of agricultural commodities, so-called non-
commodity outputs arise. These include rural and environmental amenities,
rural settlement and employment, and national food security. Sometimes also
cultural and historic heritage values, food safety, and farm animal welfare are
mentioned in this context. A new slogan, multifunctionality, has emerged in
the international policy debate to capture these features of agricultural produc-
tion.
While the economic significance of agriculture has decreased for some time in
a number of countries, income growth has resulted in a growing demand for
many of the non-commodity outputs. Through domestic agricultural policies
governments try to ensure that the provision of these outputs corresponds to
that demanded by society. Thus, even though multifunctionality as a policy
term is new, as an implicit concept in the context of domestic agricultural policy
it is not entirely new since some countries have already taken into account
selected non-commodity outputs of agriculture in their policy-making.
Multifunctionality is important from the domestic policy perspective, but it is
the implications of further liberalised agricultural trade on the multifunctional
character of agriculture that have raised this issue to the forefront in the inter-
national debate. Some countries fear that further reductions in and constraints
on domestic support would reduce the ability of governments to pursue their
domestic non-commodity objectives, whereas other countries consider that
multifunctionality is being used as a pretext for maintaining high levels of pro-
duction-related support. Hence, the concept of multifunctionality and its use as
a basis for concrete policy interventions has raised conflicting views among
the WTO members.
The most commonly cited elements of multifunctionality – environment, food
security, and the viability of rural areas – were listed as legitimate non-trade
concerns in the draft text on agriculture during the WTO Ministerial Meeting
in Seattle in 1999. The non-trade concerns related to agriculture can be defined
as domestic policy objectives that countries perceive to be threatened by the
further liberalisation of agricultural trade (Burrell 2001). However, due to its
controversial nature the term multifunctionality itself was not mentioned in the
draft text of the WTO Ministerial Meeting, and thus it did not reach a formal
status.11
It could be argued that the elements of multifunctionality are already covered
through the agreed list of non-trade concerns and that the policy relevance of
multifunctionality is in that sense vague. However, although multifunctionality
and non-trade concerns overlap, there is a fundamental difference between
these concepts that has important implications for policy design. Whereas
multifunctionality provides an integrated framework for the simultaneous con-
sideration of multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs, non-trade con-
cerns are dealt with as separate issues. That is, each non-trade concern is sepa-
rately linked to commodity production, but tradeoffs and complementarities
between alternative non-commodity outputs are not explicitly recognised.
Clearly, multifunctionality constitutes a complex problem from the perspec-
tive of policy design and implementation. Finding out the socially optimal bun-
dle of multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs involves the identifica-
tion of the important outputs as well as their relative significance, which in
itself is a challenging task. Moreover, policies promoting multifunctional agri-
culture must address simultaneously several outputs, commodity and non-com-
modity, which have tradeoffs and complementarities in their supply. Even if
some non-commodity outputs of agriculture have in cases been taken into ac-
count in national policy-making, they have been addressed indirectly through
commodity-related interventions. Now they are to be addressed directly. All
this is further complicated by the fact that the heterogeneous conditions under
which agriculture operates bring into being a spatial dimension in both the sup-
ply of and demand for non-commodity outputs. There are spatial differences in
productivity and, hence, in production costs of commodity and non-commod-
ity outputs on the supply side, and spatial valuation differences on the demand
side. Finally, there is the practical problem that the information requirements
and related transaction costs for designing and implementing spatially differ-
entiated interventions in order to maximise social welfare from optimal bun-
dles of commodity and non-commodity outputs may be quite extensive, where-
fore governments may be obligated to look for less effective solutions which
are less information-intensive but which distort production decisions and thus
trade.
So far, the economic analysis of policy design for multifunctionality has mainly
been conceptual. OECD (2001a) provides some preliminary policy guidance
that is based on the working definition of multifunctionality and on the con-
ceptual framework developed by the OECD. However, owing to the concep-
tual nature of the analysis, the guidance for policy design remains quite gen-
eral; for example, whether policy intervention is warranted or not and what
kind of policy interventions (coupled with or decoupled from commodity pro-
duction) would most likely be efficient. Thus, it could be argued that due to the
conceptual nature of the existing studies, the economic analysis of policy de-
sign for multifunctionality has not yet been rigorously conducted. A major12
problem in the previous literature is that the commodity and non-commodity
outputs have not been rooted in an integrated analytical and empirical frame-
work in which the multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs are con-
sidered accurately and simultaneously.
1.2 Objectives and outline of the study
The objective of this study is to contribute to the understanding of the implica-
tions of multifunctionality for effective agri-environmental policy design. The
main research question addressed is how various types of policy interventions
perform in achieving the optimal bundle of multifunctional outputs under het-
erogeneous conditions.
The rigorous treatment of jointness between commodity and non-commodity
outputs and the related implications for policy design under heterogeneous con-
ditions requires that input use and land use are endogenous in the analysis so
that farmers’ responses to policy interventions in both intensive and extensive
margins can be determined. Lichtenberg (1989, 2000) provides an excellent
core for examining farmers’ input use and land allocation choices under het-
erogeneous conditions (heterogeneous land quality). However, his model does
not have a spatial structure, which plays an important role in the analysis of
such non-commodity outputs as landscape diversity and agrobiodiversity. The
present study covers all three aspects: endogenous input use and land alloca-
tion, heterogeneity, and spatiality.
Figure 1 illustrates the contents of the study. The study focuses on two com-
modity outputs and three environmental non-commodity outputs of multi-
functional agriculture. These are considered simultaneously, taking into ac-
count the special features of jointness and heterogeneity in the production, and
externality and public good aspects in demand. In order to achieve the optimal
production of these multifunctional outputs, various policy solutions are exam-
ined.
The starting point for the analysis is the conceptual framework on multi-
functionality developed by the OECD (2001a). However, the present study at-
tempts to move from concepts to a formal analysis and from there further to
empirical applications. This is done by developing an integrated analytical and
empirical framework that provides a sound basis for policy design and evalua-
tion.
Of the non-commodity outputs of multifunctional agriculture, the scope of the
present study is restricted to the environmental dimension of multifunctionality.
There are several reasons for this. First, the environmental dimension is the13
Figure 1. Components of the study.
least controversial one in the international debate. Second, the joint production
process is apparent in this dimension. Third, the environmental non-commod-
ity outputs clearly possess the characteristics of externalities or public goods,
some of them being in fact pure public goods. The analytical sections of the
present study are generally applicable, but the empirical parameters of the para-
metric model apply to Finland only.
The study is structured as follows. Chapter 1 of the study (introduction) con-
tinues with a short presentation of the key concepts used in the study. It also
describes the context for multifunctional agriculture in Finland. Chapter 2 (lit-
erature review) discusses the supply, demand and policy aspects that are spe-
cific to multifunctional agriculture. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 constitute the core of
the study. They examine the optimal provision of multifunctional outputs with-
out government intervention (Chapter 3), the use of differentiated (first-best)
and uniform (second-best) policy instruments for promoting multifunctional
agriculture (Chapter 4), as well as some “real-life” policy instruments (Chap-
ter 5). All these are investigated both analytically and by means of an empiri-
cal application with Finnish data. Chapter 6 concludes the study and discusses
its main findings, policy implications, and limitations.
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1.3 Core concepts
The core concepts and terms used in the present study are defined in this sec-
tion. The aim is to provide a quick overview rather than a comprehensive dis-
cussion, since some of the concepts presented here will be further elaborated
and discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2.
In the present study the terms multifunctionality, multifunctional agriculture
and the multifunctional character of agriculture are used interchangeably.
As there is no universally accepted definition for the concept of multi-
functionality, a “working definition” provided by the OECD (2001a) is
adopted. According to this definition, the fundamentals of multifunctionality
are:
(i) the existence of multiple commodity and non-commodity
outputs that are jointly produced
(ii) the fact that some of the non-commodity outputs exhibit the
characteristics of externalities or public goods
Hence, multifunctional agriculture may be defined as an economic activity
which, besides its primary function of producing agricultural commodities, af-
fects social welfare by producing multiple positive or negative non-commodity
outputs jointly with the commodity production. Thus, in economic terms,
multifunctional agriculture produces jointly private goods, public goods, and
positive or negative externalities.
It is worth noting that agriculture is by no means the only economic activity
with multifunctional characteristics. For example, forestry provides several
non-commodity outputs jointly with timber production. However, in the present
study the term multifunctionality refers only to the joint production of non-
commodity outputs with agricultural commodities. The significance of forestry
to Finnish farms and the significance of farmers as forest owners in Finland
nevertheless attach an interesting feature to the multifunctional character of
Finnish agriculture. Finnish farmers provide non-commodity outputs such as
landscape diversity, biodiversity, and viability of rural areas both through
multifunctional agriculture and multiple-use forestry. Farmers’ management
decisions with respect to agricultural land and production practices, but equally
those with respect to forested land and timber harvesting, play a crucial role in
the supply of several non-commodity outputs in rural areas. Consequently, the
distinction between the non-agricultural provision of non-commodity outputs
and that of their agricultural provision is somewhat vague because the same
management unit shapes the provision of non-commodity outputs from both
agriculture and forestry.15
Commodity outputs refer to agricultural commodities that are private goods.
These include crops, farm animal products, fibres, energy plants, and so on.
Non-commodity outputs, in turn, refer to non-market goods that arise as a side
effect of the commodity production, such as landscape and environmental
amenities.
Joint production or jointness refers to a situation where two or more outputs
are produced interdependently so that a change in the supply of one output
affects the levels of the other outputs. According to the OECD (2001a), three
frequently distinguished causes for jointness are
(i) technical and biological interdependencies in the production
process
(ii) non-allocable inputs
(iii) allocable inputs that are fixed at the firm level
One example of a technical interdependence between commodity and non-com-
modity outputs is fertilizer use, which results in both increased yields and in-
creased nutrient runoffs. The joint production of milk and manure, in turn, pro-
vides an example of a non-allocable input (cow). An example of jointness due
to allocable inputs that are fixed at the firm level in the short run is the alloca-
tion of agricultural land between commodity production and wildlife habitat,
such as conservation headlands.
According to Baumol and Oates (1988: 17-18), there are two conditions for an
externality. First, “an externality is present whenever some individual’s utility
or production relationships include real variables, whose values are chosen by
others without particular attention to the effects on this individual’s welfare”.
Second, “the decision maker whose activity affects others’ utility levels or en-
ters their production function, does not receive (pay) in compensation for this
activity an amount equal in value to the resulting benefits (or costs) to others”.
Thus, in brief, an externality can be defined as an uncompensated effect on a
utility function or production set. The eutrophication of surface waters due to
nutrient runoffs is an example of a negative externality produced by agricul-
ture.
A pure public good possesses the following characteristics: it is non-rival in
consumption and yields benefits that are non-excludable (Callan and Thomas
1996). Non-rivalry means that one agent’s consumption of the good does not
preclude that of the others. In other words, there is a zero marginal cost for an
additional consumer of the good (Stiglitz 1988). Non-excludability means that
it is impossible or prohibitively costly to exclude agents from consuming the
good. Thus, because of non-rivalry it is not desirable and because of non-ex-
cludability it is not feasible to ration the use of the public good (Stiglitz 1988).16
The non-use values of landscape and agrobiodiversity can be regarded as ex-
amples of pure public goods.
The environmental dimension of multifunctionality or environmental multi-
functionality refers to the joint production of commodities with environmental
non-commodity outputs. The latter include positive non-commodity outputs,
such as landscape diversity and agrobiodiversity, but also negative ones, such
as impairment of the groundwater and surface water quality due to nutrient and
pesticide leaching and runoffs, as well as loss of wildlife due to the use of
chemicals and fragmentation and loss of habitats.
The environmental non-commodity outputs, however, may also have indirect
effects on the other dimensions of multifunctionality. For example, the attrac-
tiveness of rural areas for both the rural and urban population is affected by
environmental quality and by landscape amenities (OECD 2001a). Through the
natural resource base and the productive capacity of agriculture, environmen-
tal outputs, such as erosion and agrobiodiversity, may also affect food security
as long as domestic production is regarded as an important part of this.
According to the Convention on Biological Diversity (UNEP 1992), biologi-
cal diversity or biodiversity is the variability among all living organisms from
all sources, including terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems, and the
ecological complexes of which they are a part. Agrobiodiversity is that part of
biodiversity which relates to agriculture and agro-ecosystems. Like biodiver-
sity, this can also be described at three fundamental levels: the diversity of
ecosystems, species, and genes. Qualset et al. (1995) define agrobiodiversity
to include all crops and livestock and their wild relatives, as well as all the
interacting species of pollinators, symbionts, parasites, predators, and competi-
tors. Beyond its role in the production of food and fibre, agrobiodiversity has
multiple functions in agro-ecosystems. These include the recycling of nutri-
ents, the regulation of hydrological processes, the control of microclimate, the
regulation of undesirable organisms, and the detoxification of noxious chemi-
cals (Altieri and Nicholls 1999). Swift and Anderson (1994) divide the biotic
components of agro-ecosystems into three types: productive biota such as crops
and livestock, resource biota that increase the productivity of the agro-ecosys-
tem, such as pollinators and soil biota, and, finally,  destructive biota such as
weeds, pests, and pathogens.
Gliessman (2000) defines an ecosystem to be a functional system of comple-
mentary relations between living organisms and their environment, delimited
by arbitrarily chosen boundaries, which in space and time appear to maintain a
steady, yet dynamic equilibrium. Whereas the structure of an ecosystem refers
to its parts and their relationships, its function refers to the dynamic processes
occurring within the ecosystem. An agroecosystem can be defined as a site of
agricultural production that is understood as an ecosystem, for example, a group17
of farms in the context of a watershed, an individual farm, or a farm field
(Gliessman 2000). A fundamental feature of agroecosystems, compared to natu-
ral ecosystems, is the human intervention that usually aims to reduce species
diversity in order to obtain the largest possible yield of the cultivated crops (Swift
and Anderson 1994). Swift and Anderson (1994) subdivide a field ecosystem
into the following components: (i) the plant subsystem, including the cultivated
crop, weeds, and legumes and their obligatory pathogens and symbionts, (ii) the
herbivore subsystem, including farm animals, predators, parasites, and
parasitoids, and (iii) the soil or decomposer subsystem, including soil organic
matter, soil micro-organisms such as bacteria, fungi, and algae, and micro-,
meso-, macro- and megafauna (earthworms). The functions of a field ecosys-
tem refer to processes such as the flow of energy and the cycling of nutrients
(biogeochemical cycles), such as carbon and nitrogen (Swift and Anderson
1994).
According to the OECD (2001b), agricultural landscapes are the visible out-
comes that result from the interaction between commodity production, natural
resources, and the environment. They include amenity, heritage, cultural, aes-
thetic, and other societal values. Three essentials of agricultural landscapes are
their (i) structure or appearance, for instance, flora, fauna, habitats, ecosys-
tems, crops, hedges, and farm buildings, (ii) cultural, environmental, and eco-
nomic functions, and (iii) value, that is, society’s valuation of landscape.
The structure of the spatial mosaic of a landscape and its effects on ecological
systems, patterns, and processes is the focus of landscape ecology (Wiens
1995). The landscape mosaic can be described with the help of three types of
spatial elements: patches, corridors, and background matrices (Forman 1995).
In general terms, the spatial structure of the landscape is associated with the
composition (number and occurrence) and configuration (distribution and spa-
tial character) of different landscape elements (Eiden et al. 2001).
Buffer strips and field boundaries are semi-natural habitats adjacent to the
crop. In agricultural landscapes they constitute linear elements which form a
network of corridors through which organisms can move between larger habi-
tat patches. A field boundary can be defined as a strip of semi-natural vegeta-
tion bordering an arable field. Field boundaries are important as they comprise
the largest area of semi-natural vegetation in modern arable landscapes and
provide food, shelter, nesting, and overwintering sites for most of farmland
wildlife (Kleijn 1997). A buffer strip is a managed, uncultivated area that is
covered by perennial vegetation and located between the arable land and a wa-
ter body.
Buffer strips serve both ecological and environmental purposes as they pro-
mote agrobiodiversity and protect surface waters from nutrient and pesticide
runoffs. Important factors affecting the botanical diversity of field boundaries18
and buffer strips include the nutrient and herbicide load from the adjacent
cropland, disturbance by farming operations, mowing and removing of the
cuttings, and the width of the boundary or the buffer strip. Low disturbance
levels, low agro-chemical load, removing of the cuttings, and sufficient width
maximise botanical diversity (see e.g. Kleijn 1997, Kleijn and Snoeijing 1997,
Ma et al. 2002, Schippers and Joenje 2002).
According to Gilliam et al. (1997), buffer strips are very effective in the removal
of sediment-associated nitrogen from surface runoff and nitrate from subsur-
face flows, and removals of 50–90% have been common. However, the effec-
tiveness of buffer strips in removing nutrients from surface water and
groundwater depends highly on hydrology. For example, surface flows should
occur as a sheet flow rather than as focused flows, and groundwater should
move at a slow speed through the buffer in order for nitrates to be effectively
removed (Correll 1997). According to Hill (1996), vegetation uptake and mi-
crobial denitrification are the two major mechanisms in buffer strips for re-
moving nitrates from subsurface water, but the relative importance of these
two processes is uncertain. Moreover, as pointed out by Gilliam et al. (1997),
the increased denitrification in buffer strip areas may trade water pollution for
atmospheric pollution due to the increased generation of N2O. It is also impor-
tant to note that buffer strips only reduce the surface runoff of nutrients but not
runoff through drainage pipes. In Finnish experiments, 50–75% of the total
nitrogen loss from cultivated fields occurred through drainage pipes (see e.g.
Turtola and Jaakkola 1987, Turtola and Puustinen 1998).
Nutrients, chiefly nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, are important inputs in
agricultural production systems. Of the three main nutrients, nitrogen and phos-
phorus may cause water quality problems in surface water and groundwater.
Runoff refers to nutrient transportation over the soil surface by rainwater and
melting snow, whereas leaching refers to the transportation of nutrients through
the soil by percolating rain and melting snow (Ribaudo et al. 1999). Nitrogen,
in the form of nitrate, is easily soluble and very mobile in the environment, but
phosphorus is relatively immobile and may build up in the soil over time. Ni-
trogen is transported from fields to water bodies through both surface runoff
and leaching, or through drainage. Phosphorus is transported from fields to
water bodies in particulate form and in dissolved form through surface runoff
(Hanley 1990, NRC 1993, Ribaudo et al. 1999).
Point source pollution refers to discharges at a specific location through a
pipe, out-fall, or ditch. Nonpoint source pollution (NPSP), or dispersed or dif-
fused pollution refers to pollution that affects waters in a more diffuse way and
is difficult to trace back to a precise source. Nutrient runoff from agriculture is
typical nonpoint source pollution, since the runoff does not emanate from a
single point except in the case of drainage but leaves the field in so many places
that an accurate monitoring of each source would be prohibitively expensive
(Ribaudo et al. 1999).19
1.4 The context for multifunctionality in Finland
When discussing a topic such as multifunctionality which is composed of sev-
eral elements, it is important to keep in mind the topic in its entirety to main-
tain an appropriate perspective on individual issues. Therefore, this section
outlines some major socio-economic and environmental features of multi-
functional agriculture in Finland1. The aim of the section is to provide some
background on the substance for the analysis and to illustrate the relevance of
the selected commodity and non-commodity outputs in a wider context. Thus,
this description draws from the specific case of Finland to provide a context
for the empirical applications in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. The data concern mainly
the year 1999, as do the empirical data in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
Finland is one of the world’s northernmost agricultural countries. Agricultural
land covers only 8% of the surface area of Finland, but Finland is the EU Mem-
ber State with the largest percentage (98.5%) of rural areas. Depending on the
definition of countryside, between 1.2 and 1.6 million Finns, or 23 to 32% of
the population, live in rural areas. (MAF 2001a).
Finnish agriculture is mainly based on relatively small, privately owned family
farms. A notable feature of Finnish farms is that 95% of all active farms own
forests; in fact, 34% of Finnish forests are owned by farmers. (MAF 2001a).
In 1999 the share of agriculture in GDP was 1.2%, but the importance of the
total food chain in the national economy is much higher. The share of agricul-
tural support in the gross return on agriculture was about 40% in 1999. The EU
contributed a little over a third of this, while the rest was covered by national
financing. In 1999 the share of agriculture in the employed labour force was
about 5%. (MTTL 2000).
The significance of agriculture in the Finnish economy has been decreasing
and production growth has been much slower than in the other sectors of the
economy (MTTL 2000). The number of people living in rural areas and gain-
ing their livelihood from agriculture has been shrinking fast (MAF 2001a). The
number of active farms has fallen from 129,000 in 1990 to 82,000 in 1999. At
the same time, the average farm size has been on the increase. During the EU
membership, that is, since 1995, the production structure has changed rapidly as
the share of animal husbandry farms has fallen, while the share of crop farms
has increased. In 1999, 43% of active farms cultivated arable crops; barley
accounted for about 30% and wheat about 5% of the total cultivated area.
(MTTL 2000).
1 For the assessment of the social costs and benefits of multifunctional agriculture in Finland
see Yrjölä and Kola (2001).20
All in all, agriculture remains the most important economic activity in rural ar-
eas, even though both the number of farms and the number of people they
employ are declining (MAF 2001a). However, the contribution of agriculture
to regional economies and employment varies between regions. In 1999 the
share of agriculture in GDP and employment was the highest in South
Ostrobothnia (7–8% in GDP and 12% in employment) and the lowest in
Uusimaa (0.2% in GDP and 0.8% in employment). (MTTL 2001).
Nutrient runoffs and the resulting eutrophication of surface waters can be re-
garded as a major negative externality of Finnish agriculture. Agriculture is the
main source of both nitrogen (43%) and phosphorus (62%) runoffs into sur-
face waters (Valpasvuo-Jaatinen et al. 1997). Hence, one of the major objec-
tives of Finland in the application of the European Union’s agri-environmental
regulation EEC 2078/92 has been the reduction of nutrient runoffs. The long-
term effects of the agri-environmental programme for 1995–99 (The General
Agricultural Environment Protection Scheme) have been expected to amount
to a 20% to 40% reduction of both nitrogen and phosphorus runoffs. In addi-
tion to this agri-environmental programme, the Finnish Government has issued
a Resolution on water protection targets to 2005. The main goals of the Reso-
lution are the reduction and prevention of eutrophication. Nutrient runoffs from
agriculture should be reduced by 50% (nitrogen from 30,000 to 15,000 tons per
year and phosphorus from 3,000 to 1,500 tons per year) from 1993 levels by
the year 2005. Moreover, in the new agri-environmental programme for 2000–
2006 improvement in the quality of surface water through reductions in nutri-
ent runoffs is still considered one of the most important policy objectives.
Although soil erosion is not a significant problem, the mechanisation of agri-
culture and the use of heavy field machinery on wet soils has resulted in soil
compaction and related soil erosion in some areas of Finland, which has in-
creased phosphorus and sediment runoffs into surface waters.
Due to the climatic conditions, that is, the hostility of the cold climate to many
pests, pesticide use per hectare is very low in Finland. Pesticide runoffs in
Finland have been estimated to vary between 0.1% to 1% of total use, depend-
ing on the pesticide used and on weather conditions (Laitinen et al. 1996). Pes-
ticide contents in water bodies occasionally exceed the limits set for drinking
water. Pesticide residues in foodstuffs have not been a problem in Finland,
since the amount of residues has consistently been lower than the limits set for
residues (Miettinen et al. 1997).
Between 1990 and 1999, greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture decreased
from 10.2 to 7.6 million tons in carbon dioxide equivalent. In 1999 agriculture
accounted for 10% of total emissions in Finland. The share of agriculture has
been estimated to be 2% of carbon dioxide, 40% of methane, and 50% of ni-21
trous oxide emissions (MAF 2001b). Of ammonia emissions in Finland agricul-
ture accounts for 90%, wherefore reducing the amount of ammonia released
from manure storing and spreading has been one of the goals of the agri-envi-
ronmental programme (Grönroos et al. 1998).
Over the past 50 years agricultural landscapes in Finland have become increas-
ingly homogeneous due to the structural change and the mechanisation, ration-
alisation, and intensification of production. Rationalisation through subsurface
drainage and the removal of small-scale elements (trees, ponds, hedges) and
forest islands has resulted in more geometric field parcels with inevitably less
value for landscape diversity and agrobiodiversity. The decline in the number
of linear landscape elements (ditch banks and arable field borders adjacent to
non-arable land) is largely explained by the replacement of open field ditches
by subsurface drainage. At the national level, subsurface drainage has replaced,
on the average, 500 m/ha of open ditches (Ruuska and Helenius 1996).
The maintenance of diverse agricultural landscapes is of particular concern in
Finland, since only 8% of the land area is used for agriculture. Although for-
estry also provides several non-commodity outputs in rural areas, not all of
them are substitutes for those of agriculture. This is especially the case with
respect to biodiversity and landscape diversity. Most of the threatened species
in Finland live either in forest habitats or in agricultural habitats, and neither of
them are substitutes for each other. Also in terms of landscape diversity, for-
estry may be a poor substitute for the landscape provision of agriculture. For
example, the results of a survey by Hietala-Koivu et al. (1999) show that affor-
estation (refers to the establishment of forest cover to land that was not previ-
ously forested, e.g. agricultural land) and land abandonment are considered the
most important factors that decrease the scenic value of landscapes. This is
confirmed by the study of Tahvanainen et al. (1996), who conducted an inter-
view survey on the effect of gradual afforestation on the scenic beauty of 32
different rural landscapes in Finland. The scenic beauty was considered to de-
crease along with the increasing intensity of afforestation. However, moderate
afforestation could have a positive effect on scenic beauty. The more attractive
the original landscape was the greater the negative effect of afforestation was
found to be.
Traditional biotopes, such as dry meadows and pastures, have the greatest
number of species diversity in Finnish landscapes. The botanical diversity of
these habitats has benefited from grazing and mowing (Pitkänen and Tiainen
2001). Specialisation in crop farming and the associated decrease in animal hus-
bandry and grazing animals has resulted in such a dramatic decline in the total
area of meadows and pastures that less than 20,000 hectares of valuable agri-
cultural heritage environments remain (Heritage Landscapes Working Group
2000). According to Pykälä and Alanen (1996), species living in heritage land-22
scapes constitute 75% of all threatened species in agricultural landscapes. Be-
cause of the decline in the area of traditional biotopes, the importance of field
boundaries and buffer strips for overall agrobiodiversity has increased.
According to Rassi et al. (1991), one out of 4 bird, 21 insect and 14 vascular
species that are endangered have suffered from the indirect effects of herbi-
cides, the disappearance of boundary habitats, and autumn ploughing.
Although the species diversity of agricultural environments has been on the
decrease, there have also been some changes in agricultural practices that pro-
mote agrobiodiversity. Most of these positive changes have been introduced by
the Finnish agri-environmental programme, like buffer strips, the management
of field boundaries, limits on fertilizer use, as well as requirements relating to
pesticide use and plant cover during winter. In addition to these so-called basic
measures of the agri-environmental programme, there are special contracts re-
lating to traditional biotopes, the promotion of biodiversity, and the manage-
ment of landscapes.
Figure 2 summarises some key data on the environmental and socio-economic
significance of Finnish agriculture.
Figure 2. Selected indicators for the significance of Finnish agriculture in 1999
(MTTL 2000,  MAF 2001a,  Valpasvuo-Jaatinen et al. 1997,  Grönroos et al.
1998, and Rassi et al. 1991).
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To conclude, the economic significance of agriculture is small from the national
perspective, although its local socio-economic role in rural areas is crucial. At
the same time, the environmental significance of agriculture is great in many
respects. Moreover, since Finnish farmers are also an important group of forest
owners in Finland, they have a twin role as custodians of multifunctional agricul-
ture and multiple-use forestry. Therefore, the agricultural and silvicultural deci-
sions and production practices of Finnish farmers are important in shaping the
occurrence of several externalities and the provision of many public goods in
Finland.24
2 Environmental multifunctionality –
Literature review
This chapter reviews the literature relating to the environmental dimension of
multifunctionality. It comprises three main sections: special features in the sup-
ply of, demand for, and policy design for environmental multifunctionality.
This structure arises from the conceptual framework provided by the OECD
(2001a), which this study makes use of. In this framework, a series of ques-
tions related to jointness on the supply side, public good characteristics on the
demand side, and the possibility of the non-governmental provision of the non-
commodity outputs are posed in order to arrive at appropriate policy guidance
for multifunctionality.
As noted by the OECD (2001a), the particularities in the supply and demand of
multifunctional outputs are crucial for any discussion on policy implications.
On the one hand, if there were no jointness in the production of multifunctional
outputs, the non-commodity outputs could be supplied independently of the
commodity production. On the other hand, if there were functioning markets
for the non-commodity outputs, supply and demand would meet through those
markets. In both cases, environmental multifunctionality becomes a non-issue
from the policy perspective2.
The literature review is geared to serve the analysis presented in Chapters 3 to
5. As such, it focuses on aspects that are specific to the environmental dimen-
sion of multifunctional agriculture. The examples presented are also selected
so as to relate to the non-commodity outputs analysed in Chapters 3 to 5, that
is, nutrient runoffs, landscape diversity, and agrobiodiversity.
It should be noted that as an explicit topic of investigation, policy design for
multifunctionality has been the subject of very little formal economic analysis.
Notable contributions include Peterson et al. (1999), Romstad et al. (2000),
Boisvert (2001), Guyomard and Levert  (2001), OECD  (2001a), and Vatn
(2002). There are, nevertheless, a number of studies that shed light on the vari-
ous individual aspects of multifunctionality. For example, there is a growing
economic literature on the policy design for controlling nutrient runoffs.
2 Naturally, public policy may be needed also in the case of non-joint non-commodity outputs.
However, in this case there may be no policy link between promoting the non-commodity
outputs and international trade flows (OECD 2001a).25
2.1 Special features in supply
As noted in Chapter 1, the existence of multiple commodity and non-commodity
outputs that are jointly produced is a fundamental feature of multifunctionality
(OECD 2001a). Joint production or jointness is a key feature in the supply side
of multifunctionality and it implies that there are interdependencies in production
so that a change in the supply of one output affects the levels of the other
outputs. Hence, the supply of commodity and non-commodity outputs needs to
be analysed within the joint production framework. It is noteworthy that joint
production is adopted as the starting point in almost all economic analysis which
explicitly examines multifunctionality, perhaps owing to the framework and
working definition provided by the OECD (2001a).
Another important feature on the supply side of environmental multifunctionality
has to do with spatial differences in supply. That is, the quantity, quality, and
composition of multifunctional outputs differ between and within countries due
to heterogeneous conditions. These heterogeneous conditions which affect the
nature of jointness and the optimal bundle of commodity and non-commodity
outputs are termed “site productivity” by the OECD (2001a).
2.1.1 Joint production
According to Shumway et al. (1984), even though technical interdependence is
generally regarded as the primary cause of jointness, also allocable fixed (or
quasi-fixed) inputs, such as land, may cause jointness. In fact, Shumway et al.
argue that jointness caused by allocable inputs is especially typical for agricul-
ture as many farms produce more than one output, the amount of land devoted
to each crop can easily be distinguished, and the amount of land is usually
fixed in the short run (Shumway et al. 1984).
Following Lau (1972),  Shumway et al. (1984)  make  a  distinction  between
jointness and nonjointness as follows. For technology to be nonjoint in inputs
requires that the profit function is additively separable in output prices:
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= r G π , where Gi is the individual profit function for the i:th out-
put, pi is the i:th product price, and r is the vector of input prices. Now the
distinction between jointness and nonjointness is given by the supply response
of the ith output to the price of the jth output, that is, for nonjointness
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j i p y  where  ) ( j i ≠ . Thus, for instance,
there is jointness (nonjointness) in the production of barley and wheat if the
supply of barley responds (does not respond) to the price of wheat.26
Lynne (1988), in his comment to Shumway et al. (1984), proposes a distinction
between “jointness in technology” and “jointness in supply” so that jointness in
technology refers to technical interdependence and jointness in supply to behav-
ioural interdependence. According to Lynne (1988), jointness, as traditionally
represented, occurs only with non-allocable inputs and is synonymous with tech-
nical interdependence. However, fixed but allocable inputs may cause behav-
ioural jointness in supply even if outputs are technically independent (nonjoint).
In their reply to Lynne (1988), Shumway et al. (1988) refer to Lynne’s argu-
ment that production functions underlying joint production do not contain alloca-
ble inputs. They provide an example of the allocation of inputs for two crops
where pesticide, which is a fully allocable input, applied to one crop in one field
affects the yield of the other crop in an adjoining field. Thus, Shumway et al.
argue that the production functions of these crops are not technically independ-
ent. In the subsequent contributions to the role of fixed but allocable inputs as a
cause of joint production, Moschini (1989) and Leathers (1991) clarify the dis-
cussion through the notion of normal inputs and the cost function approach,
respectively.
Beattie and Taylor (1985) define the technical interdependence of two outputs
as follows. Technical interdependence between two outputs produced from one
allocable input can be viewed as the change of the marginal productivity of an
input in the production of one output when the level of the other output changes.
Thus, according to Beattie and Taylor (1985), if the multioutput production
function is given by  ) , ( 2 1 y y g x = , y1 and y2 are technically complementary if
0 / 12 2 1
2 < ≡ ∂ ∂ ∂ g y y x , technically competing if  0 / 12 2 1
2 > ≡ ∂ ∂ ∂ g y y x , and
technically independent if  0 / 12 2 1
2 = ≡ ∂ ∂ ∂ g y y x . That is, technical interde-
pendence is present if one output is increased and that results in the change of
the inverse marginal productivity of the input use for another output (Beattie
and Taylor 1985).
Beattie and Taylor (1985) further define the economic interdependence of two
outputs as follows. Two outputs are economically interdependent if a change
in the price of one output affects the supply of the other output.  In other words,
two outputs yi and yj are economically competing if  0 / < ∂ ∂
∗
j i p y , economi-
cally complementary if  0 / > ∂ ∂
∗
j i p y , and economically independent if
0 / = ∂ ∂
∗
j i p y  for i, j =1,2 and  ) ( j i ≠ .
According to Boisvert (2001), the three commonly distinguished causes for joint
production (technical interdependencies in the production process, non-alloca-
ble inputs, and allocable inputs that are fixed in the short run at the firm level)
are also representative for jointness between most commodity and non-com-27
modity outputs. However, these three sources of output interdependence may
arise in various combinations and proportions, and it is unlikely for jointness to
occur in fixed proportions (Boisvert 2001).
Fertilizer or pesticide use that results in the joint production of commodities and
nutrient or pesticide runoffs is one example of a technical interdependence be-
tween commodity and non-commodity outputs. Technical interdependencies are
the source of many negative environmental externalities of commodity produc-
tion, such as the nutrient and pesticide runoffs mentioned above, leaching, soil
erosion, and greenhouse gas emissions. However, changes in farming technolo-
gies and practices may modify the composition of the commodity and non-com-
modity output bundle. (OECD 2001a).
The joint production of meat and landscape by grazing cattle provides an exam-
ple of a non-allocable input. In this case, multiple outputs arise from the same
input, but they are rarely produced in fixed proportions, and so using different
production methods may change the proportions (OECD 2001a).
Land allocation between commodity production and abatement activities such
as buffer zones represents an example of jointness which is due to allocable
inputs that are fixed at the firm level in the short run. Boisvert 2001 provides
an example where agricultural land is simultaneously an allocable and non-
allocable input: it is allocable between two commodities but non-allocable be-
tween these commodities and landscape amenities. By taxing or subsidising
the farmer, Boisvert demonstrates the economic significance of joint produc-
tion of commodity and non-commodity outputs, regardless of the cause of the
jointness. This makes it possible to compare policies aimed specifically at the
non-commodity outputs directly with commodity policy.
It has been argued that, in spite of its pervasiveness in agriculture, jointness
due to allocable inputs such as land may not be as important as the two other
sources of jointness in analysing multifunctionality. The argument rests on the
notion that the option to allocate the production of commodities and non-com-
modities to different parcels of land implies a high degree of output separation
and a low degree of jointness. (OECD 2001a). However, even in this case
jointness is present in the sense that some of the non-commodity outputs com-
pete with the commodity outputs for a fixed amount of land, and hence land
allocated for non-commodity production reduces the land available for com-
modity production. In other words, there is jointness in supply.
2.1.2 Heterogeneity
Both agricultural productivity and the site productivity of non-commodity out-
puts show significant heterogeneity due to spatial variation in the natural re-28
source base and natural conditions. Consequently, the same agricultural produc-
tion practices may produce drastically different bundles of commodity and non-
commodity outputs in different areas. Hence, the nature and degree of jointness
between commodity outputs and non-commodity outputs vary spatially.
There is spatial variation in the environmental, ecological, and economic at-
tributes of agroecosystems. According to Wossink et al. (2001), spatial varia-
tion in the abiotic environment arises from climatic and soil factors and their
interaction, and spatial variation in the biotic environment is caused by pests,
weeds, diseases, and beneficial organisms. Moreover, there is heterogeneity
with regard to a keystone species of agroecosystems – the farmer. Human capi-
tal and behavioural characteristics differ between farmers according to factors
such as age, education, experience, risk preferences, wealth, debt structure,
productive capital, and farm size (Antle and Just 1992). Thus, because of het-
erogeneity among farmers, the non-commodity output bundle may be different
even in two adjoining field parcels which share the same environmental and
ecological characteristics. In sum, through the inherent spatial variation of en-
vironmental, ecological, and economic characteristics, heterogeneity plays a
fundamental role in determining site-specific bundles of commodity and non-
commodity outputs.
The farmer (and, through him, the policy-maker) may have some control over
certain site-specific environmental and ecological characteristics while other
characteristics escape control. De Koijer et al. (1999) classify abiotic and bi-
otic factors based on their influence on crop growth as follows. The potential
for crop growth is determined by growth determining factors that are beyond
the farmer’s control, including site-specific environmental factors, such as light
and temperature, and plant intrinsic characteristics. Growth limiting factors, in
turn, are abiotic factors such as nutrients and water, which may, if short in
supply, reduce crop yield below the potential yield. The farmer has control
over these growth limiting factors which may also have detrimental environ-
mental effects. Finally, growth reducing factors, such as pests, diseases, and
weeds, reduce the attainable crop yield to the actual yield, but can be control-
led through crop protection measures, which may, again, have detrimental en-
vironmental effects.
According to Wossink et al. (2001), spatial variation and spatial relations are
treated quite superficially in economics. For example, land is typically assumed
to be homogeneous in all physical characteristics through regions. This assump-
tion of homogeneous land quality is very restrictive in the analysis of relation-
ships between commodity and non-commodity outputs, as heterogeneous land
quality is a pervasive feature of agriculture. Soil quality is part of overall land
quality and refers to the capacity of the soil to perform crop production, envi-
ronmental, and ecological functions. Important soil quality attributes which
are influenced by management include soil-depth, organic matter, respiration,29
texture, bulk density, infiltration, nutrient availability, and retention capacity
(Arshad and Martin 2002).
Antle and Just (1992) provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of inter-
actions between agricultural commodity production and the environment. In
this framework the fundamental role of the physical and economic heterogene-
ity of farms is recognised in the determination of the environmental outcomes
of commodity production. By modelling the joint distribution of production
and pollution, Antle and Just are able to analyse production-pollution trade-
offs and the effects of alternative policy instruments on both the intensive and
extensive margins. Their analysis clearly demonstrates the need to account for
farm heterogeneity in informed policy design and implementation.
2.2 Special features in demand
There are two issues to consider when analysing the demand for multifunctional
outputs (OECD 2001a). One issue is that the non-commodity outputs exhibit
the characteristics of externalities and public goods. Hence, their demand can-
not be directly observed from the markets, and demand and supply may not
meet through market transactions. Another issue is that multiple non-commod-
ity outputs are demanded simultaneously. As the outputs may be substitutes for
or complements to one another, their simultaneous aggregate demand may dif-
fer from the sum of the demands for the individual outputs.
2.2.1 Externalities and public goods
OECD (2001a) notes that there are differences between various externalities
and public goods that lead to different policy conclusions. From a policy per-
spective it is important to consider the characteristics of each non-commodity
output, asking the following questions:
(i) Does the non-commodity output exhibit the characteristics of
an externality?
(ii) if yes, does it constitute a market failure?
(iii) if yes, what kind of public good is affected?
(iv) thus, what is the scope for government intervention?
In Chapter 1, an externality was defined as an uncompensated effect on a utility
function or production set. If commodity production generates effects (costs or
benefits) that are outside the market transaction, that is, external to the market,
the market fails in the sense that the price of the commodity does not capture
these effects. As a result, the market price undervalues (overvalues) commod-30
ity production which generates external benefits (costs), and there is a tendency
for the supply to fall short for a commodity that generates benefits, whereas a
commodity that generates costs is oversupplied. Hence, an environmental mar-
ket failure occurs when the market fails to reflect the true social costs and
benefits of using environmental resources, and market prices of exchanged com-
modities fail to capture all the environmental costs and benefits associated with
a market transaction (Callan and Thomas 1996). Due to such market failures,
the price signals from commodity markets are highly unlikely to ensure the pro-
vision of the optimal bundle of commodity and non-commodity outputs. Thus,
the private and social optima for multifunctional outputs diverge. The objective
of the internalisation of externalities is to incorporate the external costs and
benefits into the optimisation calculus of economic agents through appropriate
policy instruments so that the gap between private and social costs of
multifunctional production is bridged.
OECD (2001a) has argued that in the case of multifunctional outputs the rela-
tionship between externalities and market failures becomes more complicated.
They propose three situations where an externality does not lead to market
failure. The first one is jointness in the production of the commodity output
and the non-commodity output. It is possible, according to the OECD, that a
non-commodity output which creates a positive externality is produced in suf-
ficient amounts to meet the demand of society, in which case there is no market
failure. That is, if the social and private costs of producing the positive exter-
nality coincide at the market price, there is no market failure despite the pres-
ence of an externality, even if social costs may be lower than private costs
when the commodity output is below market equilibrium. The second situation
relates to jointness in the production of two non-commodity outputs. A de-
crease in the supply of a positive externality may be associated with a decrease
in the supply of a negative externality, which reduces or offsets the market
failure. An example would be falling agricultural production, resulting in re-
duced landscape amenities but also in less eutrophication. The third situation
put forward by the OECD is triggered by consumption relationships between
the non-commodity outputs: the presence of a negative externality may reduce
the demand for the positive externality and, thus, again reduce the market fail-
ure. For example, the valuation of the scenic amenities provided by a flowering
rape field could be reduced by the knowledge of a loss of species in an adjacent
wildlife habitat caused by the agro-chemical load from the rape field. It should
be noted that these arguments proposed by OECD (2001a) concerning situa-
tions where an externality does not lead to market failure have not won unani-
mous support.
The example of agro-chemical load resulting in a loss of species in a wildlife
habitat illustrates how an environmental externality may affect an environmen-
tal resource with public good characteristics. As noted earlier, a pure public
good is non-rival in consumption and yields benefits that are non-excludable.31
However, according to the OECD (2001a), a more detailed classification of
public goods (see Table 1) is required in order to arrive at best policy choices.
Pure public goods and open access resources are difficult to provide optimally
without government intervention, but for other types of public goods the scope
for government intervention may be more limited.
In the light of the above discussion, let us briefly examine the non-commodity
outputs that are selected for analysis in Chapters 3 to 5. Nutrient runoffs from
arable lands represent a negative externality which constitutes a market failure
as the private and social costs of commodity production diverge and, due to
impairments in surface water quality, the value of the public good decreases.
Land allocation between alternative crops and linear landscape elements, such
as field boundaries and buffer strips, determine the landscape mosaic, and thus
the aesthetic and ecological values of landscape, which are public goods. The
effects of land allocation on these values are external to the commodity mar-
kets, resulting in a divergence between the private and social optima, and thus
they constitute a market failure. The agrochemical load from farming affects
wildlife habitats adjacent to arable lands and thus agrobiodiversity. Again, an
Table 1. Types of public goods (based on OECD 2001a).
Type Description Examples Scope for
government
intervention
Pure Non-excludable, Non-use value of landscape, Important role
public non-rival wildlife habitat, agrobiodiversity
goods
Local pure Non-excludable, Use value of landscape by Important/limited
public non-rival, benefits residents role (if sufficient
goods restricted to small local voluntary
jurisdictions provision)
Open Non-excludable, Use value of landscape by Important role
access non-rival, visitors
resources congestible
Common Excludable to Use value of wildlife habitat and Limited role (if
property outsiders, rival agrobiodiversity community
resources establishes rules)
Excludable Excludable, non- Non-use value of wildlife habitat Important/limited
and non- rival and agrobiodiversity if some role
rival goods institutional arrangements like
environmental trusts could be
established
Club goods Excludable, Non-use value of natural habitat Limited role
congested and biodiversity if some
institutional arrangements like
environmental trusts could be
established32
externality leading to market failure can be identified, and the public good in
question is agrobiodiversity. Hence, each non-commodity output in the ensuing
analysis is relevant from the government intervention perspective.
When discussing the degree of excludability in the consumption of non-com-
modity outputs, such as landscape, wildlife habitats, and agrobiodiversity, it is
important to note that in Finland there is a common right of access (“every-
man’s right”) to all natural (undeveloped) areas. This practice gives everyone
the right to roam freely in the countryside without obtaining permission, no
matter who owns or occupies the land. Hence, anyone may walk, ski, cycle or
ride freely in the countryside, provided that no harm is caused to property or
nature. Moreover, one may pick wild berries, mushrooms, and flowers that do
not belong to any protected species. The common right of access is, however,
limited in cultivated fields so that in the summer, hikers must go around fields
or cross them using only tracks or ditches, but during the winter, fields may be
crossed freely by skiers. (Ministry of the Environment 2002). Hence, the right
basically reduces the degree of excludability so that, for example, scenic land-
scapes, wildlife habitats, and agrobiodiversity within agricultural landscapes
are non-excludable, and thus the creation of markets or quasi-markets for these
non-commodity outputs may be difficult.
2.2.2 Valuation
When government intervention is required to address the externality and pub-
lic good characteristics of multifunctional outputs, these outputs need to be
explicitly valued. This is done in order to estimate the social demand for them
and to ensure that the intervention does not shift the bundle of non-commodity
outputs in the wrong direction or too far beyond the optimum (Santos 2000).
If the welfare-economic perspective is adopted, the concept of total economic
value captures all the values related to non-commodity outputs, that is, all use
and non-use motivated values (see e.g. Pearce and Turner 1990, Randall 1991,
Holstein 1998). The total economic value of a non-commodity output may thus
consist of several components. Table 2 lists types of economic value that may
be derived from non-commodity outputs.
The OECD (2001a) suggests that use values may dominate non-use values of
landscapes, whereas for wildlife habitats and agrobiodiversity, the opposite may
hold.
The assessment of potential multiple trade-offs between alternative non-com-
modity outputs requires that a basic system of weights is developed (Santos
2000). Economic valuation involves assigning monetary values for non-com-
modity outputs for which market values do not exist. It can help policy-makers33
to design appropriate policy interventions to achieve a welfare-increasing or
even welfare-maximising bundle of commodity and non-commodity outputs
(Santos 2000). It is therefore necessary to turn to valuation methods that have
been developed to elicit economic value in cases where it cannot be observed
from the markets. Such valuation methods can be based either on preferences
that are revealed by actual market behaviour in connection with a marketed
good that is related to the non-commodity output of interest, or on preferences
that are stated in surveys or experiments. Table 3 provides a classification of
different valuation methods.
According to Navrud (2000), the direct revealed preference methods – simu-
lated markets, market prices, and replacement costs – are simple to use but
ignore behavioural responses to changes in non-commodity outputs. While the
indirect revealed preference methods – travel costs, averting expenditure, and
hedonic price analysis – are limited to use values, stated preference methods
are able to measure the total economic value, including non-use values. The
stated preference methods are either direct, such as contingent valuation, or
indirect, such as contingent ranking and choice experiments.
Table 2. Types of economic value (OECD 1999).
Type of value Examples
Use values Use value E.g. value obtained from consuming
(looking at) a scenic landscape
Option value and E.g. value obtained from having the
quasi-option value possibility to consume a scenic
landscape in the future
Non-use  values Existence value E.g. value obtained from knowing that
the scenic landscape exists
Bequest value E.g. value obtained from knowing that
a scenic landscape is maintained for
future generations
Table 3. Types of valuation methods (Navrud 2000).
Indirect Direct
Revealed preferences Travel costs Simulated markets
Averting expenditure Market prices
Hedonic price analysis Replacement costs
Stated preferences Contingent ranking Contingent valuation
Choice experiments34
The contingent valuation method has been the most widely used of the stated
preference methods, but in recent years, also contingent ranking and choice
experiments have become popular (Navrud 2000). There are problems associ-
ated with each of the individual valuation methods, but a general discussion on
these problems is beyond the scope of the present study. Hence, let us turn to
some approaches proposed for the empirical valuation of multiple non-com-
modity outputs.
A particular valuation problem stems from the nature of environmental multi-
functionality. There are multiple outputs that are consumed simultaneously,
and these outputs may be substitutes for or complements to one another in
consumption. As a result, the social demand for the totality of the multi-
functional outputs may not be equal to the simple sum of the demand for the
individual elements of multifunctionality. Santos (2000) and Randall (2002)
discuss these consumption relationships between non-commodity outputs in
their proposals for the empirical valuation of multifunctionality.
According to Santos (2000), the single most important valuation problem re-
lated to multifunctionality are the demand interactions between the non-com-
modity outputs, which may cause severe aggregation problems when summing
up values across different non-commodity outputs. Thus, this valuation prob-
lem is not due to the jointness between commodity and non-commodity out-
puts on the supply side, but to demand side interactions. Santos (2000) pro-
poses a rule for the sequential valuation of multiple commodity price levels
and multiple non-commodity output levels in order to minimise the individual
valuation and summation (IVS) bias, which may lead to wrong policy recom-
mendations (see also Randall 1991). This aggregation bias can also be avoided
when the non-commodity outputs are valued jointly, as this automatically takes
into account any substitution effects between the non-commodity outputs.
However, Santos (2000) also notes that, while a simultaneous valuation of all
non-commodity outputs is theoretically preferable, it may be practically im-
possible, for instance, due to cognitive errors. These cognitive errors have to
do with the capacity of the respondents to consider all non-commodity outputs
and trade-offs between them in rapid valuation exercises.
According to Randall (2002), “…environmental economists have seldom if
ever attempted a task so demanding as valuing the outputs of multifunctional
agriculture”. There are two reasons why this task should be so demanding.
First, the potential “costs” of wrong valuation are high because of the inefficien-
cies in public goods provision and the possible distortions in the domestic and
international commodity markets. Second, obtaining correct values is a consid-
erable undertaking as these values are contextual and detailed and, while they
must be estimated on a national or even continental scale (for example, for the
European model of agriculture), the potential compensations for farmers are
implemented on a farm-by-farm basis. Nevertheless, Randall (2002) proposes35
two valuation strategies which can be applied in the case of multifunctional
agriculture. The first valuation strategy starts with the contingent valuation
method to obtain a holistic WTP for multiple non-commodity outputs on a conti-
nental scale. This serves as an upper-bound estimate for all local and individual
non-commodity outputs which would be estimated by the decomposition of con-
tingent valuation procedures, subjected to convergent validity tests. The second
valuation strategy uses choice experiments and the techniques of random utility
modeling and conjoint analysis.
Choice experiments belong to the class of stated preference methods which are
consistent with the random utility theory in economics and psychology. Con-
sistency with the random utility theory requires that the elicitation method pro-
vides information about preference orderings for all the choice options or for
their subset. (Louviere 2001) Choice experiments arise from conjoint analysis
but are different in the sense that, instead of ranking or rating alternative bun-
dles of attributes, the respondents are asked to choose the best one out of a set
of three or more alternatives (Navrud 2000). For further discussion on the
choice modelling approach to environmental valuation see, for example,
Bennett and Blamey (2001).
2.3 Special features in policy design
Environmental multifunctionality constitutes a multifaceted problem for effi-
cient policy design and implementation for at least the following reasons: (i)
the policy instruments or instrument combinations should be able to address
several commodity and non-commodity outputs simultaneously, (ii) heteroge-
neous conditions lead to spatial differences in agricultural productivity and the
site productivity of non-commodity outputs, (iii) there are spatial valuation dif-
ferences on the demand side, (iv) the spatial dimensions of the supply of and
demand for non-commodity outputs do not always coincide, and (v) there are
trade-offs between spatially differentiated and tailored policy instruments and
their information requirements and related administrative costs.
Bearing these multiple problems in mind, the discussion in this section is struc-
tured as follows. As there are only few commonly known studies which specifi-
cally deal with the formal policy design for multifunctionality, the section starts
with a review of these studies. This is followed by a brief review of economic
studies on the policy design for selected non-commodity outputs which are cen-
tral to the present study: nutrient runoffs, landscape diversity, and
agrobiodiversity. Finally, the implications of heterogeneity and transaction costs
for efficient policy design are discussed.36
2.3.1 Policy design for multifunctionality
Peterson et al. (1999) develop a general equilibrium framework for analysing
optimal environmental policies under multifunctionality and relate these opti-
mal policies to international trade. Their model is based on aggregate multi-
output technology: agricultural and non-agricultural commodities are produced
by land and non-land inputs, and two non-commodity outputs (emissions and
landscape amenities) are jointly produced by agricultural inputs. Peterson et al.
show that the socially optimal policy is to use the combination of a tax on
agricultural non-land input and a subsidy on agricultural land input and that the
levels of these instruments have to be determined jointly. Moreover, since the
emission function for each acre is convex, the optimal subsidy for an acre of
land exceeds the amenity value of that acre as the marginal acre of agricultural
land decreases the total pollution. In the empirical application Peterson et al.
estimate that the optimal subsidy for agricultural land is 50% higher than the
amenity value of that land.
Peterson et al. (1999) analyse the implications of optimal environmental policy
under multifunctionality for international trade in the cases of a closed, small
open, and large open economy. An important distinguishing feature in their
analysis compared to traditional literature on trade and the environment (for a
survey of this literature see e.g. Ulph 1998) is the combination of environmen-
tal policy instruments aimed for multiple externalities. However, their results
are conventional in the sense that small economies have no incentive to distort
their environmental policies from first-best levels, but large economies have
an incentive to manipulate the terms of trade in their favour. In the empirical
simulations Peterson et al. show that by using domestic environmental policy
the U.S. could increase the world prices of agricultural products by 9% com-
pared to the base case of no environmental policy intervention.
Boisvert (2001) analyses policy design for multifunctionality by using a farm
level model. In his model two agricultural commodities are produced with a
land input and a purchased input. Whereas landscape amenities (positive exter-
nality) are produced by land allocated to both commodities, the environmental
residual (negative externality) is associated with the purchased input and land
used for only one of the commodities. The production of the environmental re-
sidual is convex with respect to the application of the purchased input but de-
creases if the production of the commodity becomes more land intensive. Land-
scape amenities are concave with respect to land used in the production of the
commodities. Boisvert analyses five alternative cases in order to illustrate the
causes and implications of joint production in the multifunctionality context.
Among other things, he demonstrates the economic significance of the joint
production of commodity and non-commodity outputs, regardless of the cause
of the jointness. That is, when the social costs and benefits of non-commodity
outputs are explicitly accounted for in the farmer’s decision making, joint prod-37
ucts which are technically interdependent are revealed to be economically inter-
dependent as well.
Guyomard and Levert (2001) develop a conceptual framework for analysing
how traditional farm income support programmes meet the objectives of in-
come support, the promotion of positive externalities, and the reduction of
negative externalities, as well as the potential trade distortions of these support
policies. Their analytical model contains three equilibrium conditions: (i) the
agricultural commodity market where aggregate supply equals aggregate de-
mand, which consists of domestic demand and exports, (ii) the land market
where aggregate supply equals aggregate demand, with explicit land trades be-
tween farmers, and (iii) an entry/exit condition that permits the endogenous
determination of the number of farms. Positive and negative externalities are
modelled as follows. It is assumed that positive externalities are related to the
number of producers. This assumption is based on Hueth (2000), where the
existence of relatively high-cost producers is explained by the desire to sustain
rural communities; in other words, society values the production of the high-
cost producers beyond its market value. Negative externalities are linked to the
intensity of fertilizer and pesticide use.
The farm income support programmes analysed are price support, production-
linked direct payments, land-based direct payments, and decoupled direct pay-
ments with and without mandatory production. The results are reported with
respect to farmers’ income, the number of farms, the level of intensification,
and commodity exports. The main results from the comparative static analysis
are as follows. A decoupled direct payment without mandatory production af-
fects only farmers’ income. A decoupled direct payment with mandatory pro-
duction has a positive effect on the number of farms while the other effects are
indeterminate. A land-based direct payment has a positive effect on farmers’
income and on exports and reduces intensity, while its effect on the number of
farms is indeterminate. A production-linked direct payment increases farmers’
income, exports, and intensification, while the effect on the number of farms is
indeterminate.
Romstad et al. (2000) analyse a wide variety of policy measures for promoting
multifunctionality in a Norwegian setting. The policy measures are evaluated
with the help of production theory and resource allocation mechanisms (an ex-
tension of traditional principal-agent models), as well as alternative theories of
farmers’ behaviour, including profit maximisation, utility maximisation, and
norms-driven choices. In the evaluation of the policies, consideration is given
to trade-offs between the precision and the transaction costs of the policy in-
struments, and to the marginal costs of public funds. The analysis is conducted
in a stepwise manner, starting from jointness and moving to the case where
private and public goods are complementary or competing and, finally, to the
case where public goods are relational. In the case of jointness and a poorly38
competitive agricultural sector internationally, Romstad et al. (2000) find that
price support equal to the marginal value of the jointly produced public good is
the most efficient policy alternative. The role of direct payments for the public
goods increases when there are complementary or competing relationships. In
the case of relational public goods, Romstad et al. find it very difficult to de-
sign a payment scheme that would produce the optimal bundle of public goods.
Latacz-Lohmann (2000) develops a conceptual framework for assessing trade-
offs and synergies between domestic agri-environmental policies and trade
policies in the context of the environmental dimension of multifunctionality.
On the basis of the theory of joint production, Latacz-Lohmann first elaborates
the concept of multifunctionality and shows that government intervention to
internalise environmental externalities increases domestic social welfare even
though it may, because of the joint production, affect the quantities produced
and traded. Next, Latacz-Lohmann incorporates multifunctionality into a par-
tial equilibrium trade model developed by Anderson (1992). The model is used
to analyse the trade and welfare implications of agri-environmental policies in
a large open economy. Alternative cases involving positive and negative exter-
nalities in either exporting or importing countries, or both, are assessed. Two
of the cases analysed may be particularly problematic in the context of trade
negotiations. One such case is the internalisation of a positive production ex-
ternality in a large importer country, which reduces the quantity traded, and
thus the world price. Another one is the internalisation of a negative produc-
tion externality in a large exporter country, which may curb production and
thus reduce trade flows and raise the world price. This may adversely affect
low-income net-importers (Latacz-Lohmann 2000).
2.3.2 Policy design for selected non-commodity outputs
Nutrient runoffs. In the case of agricultural nonpoint source pollution (NPSP),
standard solutions for point source pollution, such as effluent standards and
effluent taxes, cannot be applied directly, since pollution flows from nonpoint
sources cannot be monitored with reasonable accuracy or at reasonable cost
(Shortle and Dunn 1986). When effluents or runoffs cannot be addressed di-
rectly because of the nonpoint features of agricultural pollution, the regulator is
forced to use indirect instruments, such as input and output taxes, to avoid costly
monitoring and enforcement. NPSP instruments that have been proposed or
implemented in practice include taxes on polluting inputs, subsidies for abating
inputs or technology, liability for damages, taxes and subsidies on ambient con-
centrations, tradable permits (for example, point-nonpoint source trading), and
regulations of inputs and technology (that is, the regulation of farm management
practices). Of the proposed instruments for controlling NPSP, especially input
and ambient taxes and subsidies have gained the most interest in economic lit-
erature (Shortle et al. 1998).39
According to Segerson (1988), due to the stochastic nature of agricultural pollu-
tion, that is, the fact that ambient pollution levels resulting from agricultural pro-
duction activities depend on a number of stochastic variables (like rainfall, tem-
perature, or wind) in a manner that cannot be predicted with certainty, there will
be a range of possible environmental outcomes associated with any given abate-
ment practice or effluent level at any given time. In other words, because of the
natural variability associated with the runoff process, a specific policy instru-
ment or abatement practice will yield a distribution of outcomes rather than a
single outcome. Thus, policy instruments for controlling NPSP should be evalu-
ated in terms of their effect on the distribution of outcomes, as determined by
distributions of the underlying random variables (Braden and Segerson 1993). In
the case of NPSP, policy goals should be defined in terms of the probability of
attaining, for example, a mean ambient water quality or a mean runoff with the
least cost. Furthermore, due to the stochastic factors even policies that reduce
ambient pollution with the least cost may unintentionally increase the variability
of pollution levels and thus increase social damage (Shortle 1990, Ribaudo
et al. 1999).
Monitoring nonpoint source pollution creates additional problems and uncertainty.
Braden and Segerson (1993) divide these monitoring problems into three cat-
egories: (i) the inability to observe runoffs, (ii) the inability to infer runoffs from
observable inputs, and (iii) the inability to infer runoffs from ambient environ-
mental quality. In general, the inability to observe runoffs is the most problem-
atic feature of NPSP, and the feature that most distinguishes it from point source
pollution. Monitoring agricultural runoffs is impractical, as runoffs are by defini-
tion diffuse. Although many agricultural pollutants are closely associated with
specific and observable production inputs like fertilizers and pesticides, the pol-
lution resulting from a given quantity of application may depend not only on the
total quantity applied but also on the weather, soil characteristics, crop uptake,
topography, the timing of application, and so on. The inability to infer runoffs
from observed ambient environmental quality is the result of both the influence
of other polluting farmers and natural randomness. (Braden and Segerson 1993).
The site-specific nature of agricultural NPSP also has important implications for
policy design. Since site-specific factors, such as soil quality, soil slope and hy-
drology, have a great impact on the runoff process, policy instruments that
are flexible enough to provide cost-effective outcomes under variable condi-
tions should be preferred (Braden and Segerson 1993, Ribaudo et al. 1999).
The economic literature on the design of nonpoint source pollution control
started by an article by Griffin and Bromley (1982). Subsequent influential con-
tributions were made by Shortle and Dunn (1986) and Segerson (1988).
Griffin and Bromley (1982) evaluate four alternative policies for controlling
NPSP under certainty related to runoffs (non-stochastic runoff function). The40
instruments analysed are incentives and standards based on either runoffs or
input use/farm management. Griffin and Bromley show that all these instru-
ments exhibit least-cost properties of pollution control and are equally effi-
cient when properly specified. However, the instruments vary in terms of the
number of parameters to be specified by the controlling agency. If there are J
pollution sources and N management practices/inputs, the number of instru-
ments necessary for accomplishing the environmental goal at least cost is one
for runoff incentives, J for runoff standards, and J x N for input/management
incentives and standards.
Shortle and Dunn (1986) point out that the results of Griffin and Bromley
(1982) on the equal efficiency of alternative instruments hold when there is a
single polluting farm maximising expected profits, information is symmetric
between the farmer and the controlling agency, and the damage function is
linear. However, allowing asymmetric information and a non-linear damage
function affects the relative efficiency of incentives and standards.
Shortle and Dunn (1986) incorporate uncertainty about the level of runoff and
weather conditions when examining the relative expected efficiency of incen-
tives and standards based on estimated runoffs and farm management prac-
tices/inputs. They show that under asymmetric information incentive-based
policies are more efficient than standards since they allow the farm to utilise its
informational advantage related to the operation of the farm. When there is
both asymmetric information and a non-linear damage function, incentives on
farm management practices/inputs are more efficient than runoff-based incen-
tives. This is because incentives on management practices/inputs induce opti-
mal behaviour, while runoff-based incentives do not since they cannot be speci-
fied to internalise damages in the case of a non-linear damage function.
Segerson (1988) proposes ambient-based incentives (taxes and subsidies) to
overcome the monitoring problems of NPSP. In her model, the regulatory agency
monitors ambient pollutant levels for a particular water body and pays (charges)
firm-specific subsidies (taxes) when pollutant levels are below (exceed) target
levels. This ambient tax or subsidy scheme can, under restrictive conditions,
provide correct incentives for polluters to undertake socially efficient abate-
ment, that is, the scheme provides each polluter the efficient marginal incentive
to abate (Braden and Segerson 1993). Subsequent contributions to ambient-
based instruments have focused mainly on the moral hazard problem of control-
ling NPSP when there is uncertainty about the relationship between input use
and ambient concentrations of pollutants and when input use is costly to monitor
(Shortle et al. 1998).
Landscape diversity. The economic analysis of policy design relating to land-
scape diversity is very scarce. Brunstad et al. (1999) analyse the optimal level
of landscape preservation in Norway. They introduce a method for incorporat-41
ing willingness to pay for landscape preservation in the objective function of a
price-endogenous mathematical-programming sector model of Norwegian ag-
riculture. The model is then used for calculating the optimal size of the agricul-
tural sector and the optimal level of subsidies. Their results show that in the
optimal solution the current levels of support, production, and employment
would decrease significantly. Thus, they conclude that the high levels of agri-
cultural support in Norway cannot be defended by the landscape preservation
argument alone.
Agrobiodiversity. The economic literature on the policy design for agro-
biodiversity is relatively recent and scarce. Notable contributions have been
made by Wossink et al. (1999), Van Wenum et al. (1999), and Van Wenum
et al. (2001).
Van Wenum et al. (1999) analyse the impact of farm heterogeneity on the pro-
duction of wildlife. They present the functional form and an estimation tech-
nique for a wildlife production function at the farm level, and develop a ran-
dom effects model to capture the relationship between wildlife output, man-
agement practices, non-observed farm-specific factors, and regional conditions.
Species richness and a wildlife yardstick are used in the estimation of the pro-
duction function. The results show that farm-specific conditions have a signifi-
cant impact on wildlife production.
Van Wenum et al. (2001) use a location-specific model with the integer pro-
gramming technique for optimising wildlife management on crop farms. The
most important model outcome is the farm-level wildlife – cost frontier. The
results also show that the rotation of wildlife activities within a farm is eco-
nomically preferable to the fixed location of wildlife practices.
Wossink et al. (1999) use network design modelling and GIS for analysing the
regional supply of wildlife conservation. They first show how network design
modelling can be used for the optimal spatial selection of field margins for
creating wildlife corridors in the landscape. Their empirical application is im-
plemented using the GIS model. The results show that selective control has
clear advantages in wildlife conservation: more wildlife is obtained at lower
costs when the ecologically most important margins are identified.
2.3.3 Policy design under heterogeneous conditions
The simultaneous consideration of several commodity and non-commodity
outputs under heterogeneous conditions calls for the spatial targeting of policy
interventions. Spatial targeting increases the precision with which a policy
meets its goals. However, the success of such spatial targeting depends, for
example, on the relationship between the productivity of the commodity outputs42
and the site productivity of the non-commodity outputs (Latacz-Lohman 2001).
Latacz-Lohman (2001) shows that, if agricultural productivity and environmen-
tal sensitivity are positively correlated, a trade-off must be made between envi-
ronmental effectiveness (targeting environmentally sensitive land) and costs in
terms of forgone output. If, by contrast, agricultural productivity and environ-
mental sensitivity are negatively correlated, environmental improvements can
be bought at relatively low costs as the targeted land has low productivity in
commodity production.
Hochman and Zilberman (1978) introduce a microparameter model for analys-
ing pollution – production trade-offs. This model integrates physical and eco-
nomic models at a disaggregate level to capture the heterogeneity of site char-
acteristics, and then statistically aggregates the microunits into the level needed
for policy analysis. This basic model has later been used in several studies
examining agriculture – environment relationships (for a brief review of differ-
ent studies using this approach, see Lichtenberg 2000).
Lichtenberg (2000) analyses the use of differentiated and uniform fertilizer
taxes under heterogeneous land quality and land allocation between two crops.
He first assumes that environmental quality depends only on the total use of
the polluting input (fertilizer) and is invariant with respect to land quality and
crop. Under this assumption, Lichtenberg shows that a constant per unit tax
(uniform tax) on fertilizer results in socially optimal fertilizer use as well as in
the optimal land allocation between crops. Next, Lichtenberg assumes that en-
vironmental quality also depends on land quality and crop. Under this assump-
tion he shows that the social optimum cannot be achieved by a uniform tax, but
that the socially optimal fertilizer use and land allocation between crops re-
quire a tax whose rate varies according to land quality and crop produced. In
his discussion concerning the implementation of such differentiated first-best
instruments, Lichtenberg notes that differentiated fertilizer taxes would be diffi-
cult to implement, but in the case of scenic amenities and wildlife habitats their
implementation would be more feasible.
Helfand and House (1995) analyse NPSP control under heterogeneous condi-
tions in the case of nitrate pollution from lettuce production in the Salinas Val-
ley. They find the costs of uniform input taxes to be relatively small compared
to individual input taxes, which represent the cost-efficient solution. Fleming
and Adams  (1997) have analysed alternative tax policies for controlling
groundwater nitrates from irrigated agriculture. They also found that the gains
from spatially differentiated taxes were quite modest. According to Shortle
et al. (1998), these results are unusual, since many other empirical studies have
shown that information-intensive and highly targeted instruments in most cases
clearly outperform uniform instruments when transaction costs are not taken
into account.43
2.3.4 Transaction costs
While spatially differentiated instruments could perform better in the provision
of multiple non-commodity outputs, this better performance involves a higher
administrative burden. Thus, there are inherent trade-offs between the precision
(the degree of goal attainment) of a policy and its related transaction costs
(Vatn 2001, 2002). According to Falconer et al. (2001), although there is wide-
spread recognition of the importance of taking transaction costs into account
when evaluating agri-environmental policies, there are only few studies that pro-
vide empirical estimates of these costs (notable exceptions are McCann and
Easter 1998 and Whitby and Saunders 1996).
The transaction costs related to agri-environmental policy could be defined as
administrative costs associated with the design, implementation, monitoring,
and enforcement of the policy. According to Vatn (2001), transaction costs play
a crucial role in the determination of optimal policy, and the increased costs of
precision have to be weighed against the potential gains in achieving the objec-
tive. Moreover, as precision increases, its marginal utility is likely to decrease,
while its marginal transaction costs are likely to increase (Vatn 2001). Thus,
when all costs are considered, it is not reasonable to expect that a precise in-
strument is necessarily the optimal one (Vatn 2002). In the case of environ-
mental multifunctionality, the trade-off between transaction costs and preci-
sion depends on the relationship between the commodity and non-commodity
outputs. If the outputs are joint products from a non-allocable input, high pre-
cision can be achieved even with quite few measures, but in the case of com-
plementary or competitive outputs, payments must be directed towards non-
commodity outputs, which implies high transaction costs (Vatn 2001).
Vatn (2002) discusses the consequences of multifunctional agriculture for inter-
national trade regimes. He analyses the implications for trade policy when there
is joint production between commodity and non-commodity outputs as well as
positive transaction costs. He shows that the core issue is the intrinsic trade-off
between the precision of a policy instrument and policy-specific transaction
costs. If jointness or complementarity is involved, it may not be rational to use
direct payments aimed for non-commodity outputs as a universal rule for
multifunctional policy design, since it may be more reasonable to pay via the
joint commodity output. Thus, it may not be rational to have free trade for com-
modity outputs while paying separately for non-commodity outputs. This is be-
cause the increased transaction costs of targeted policy measures may be higher
than the gains obtained from improved precision. Vatn concludes analysis with
two important observations concerning situations where there is joint production
between commodity and non-commodity outputs as well as positive transaction
costs. First, if countries are not equally competitive in commodity markets, free
trade may not be the optimal solution. Second, because of positive transaction44
costs, policy measures linked to commodity prices may be used to obtain the
efficient supply of non-commodity outputs. (Vatn 2002).
2.4 Conclusions
This chapter presented a review of the economic literature relating to specific
supply, demand, and policy aspects of the environmental dimension of multi-
functionality. This literature review provides the basis for the choice of the
analytical and empirical approaches for environmental multifunctionality in
the present study. The central components of this approach include joint pro-
duction under heterogeneous conditions, the externality and public good char-
acteristics of selected non-commodity outputs and the related valuation of these
outputs, and the targeting and precision of policy instruments.45
3 Socially optimal multifunctional agriculture
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter an analytical framework for characterising socially optimal multi-
functional agriculture under heterogeneous conditions is developed. To this end,
the joint production of two commodity and three environmental non-commodity
outputs is analysed in a model of endogenous input use and land allocation.
Lichtenberg’s model of crop production (1989) is employed to examine farm-
ers’ input use and land allocation choices under heterogeneous land quality.3
This model is augmented by a description of how landscape diversity,
agrobiodiversity, and nutrient runoffs are determined by the input and land
allocation choices. Lichtenberg’s model does not have any spatial structure,
but in this study an assumption is made concerning the spatial structure of the
arable land as it plays an important role in the analysis of our non-commodity
outputs (see Figure 3).
The diversity valuation function is described as a product of “landscape diver-
sity” and “agrobiodiversity”. The choice of crops and the land area devoted to
them are linked to the landscape and agrobiodiversity valuation as follows.
Land allocation between crops together with buffer strips and other field
boundaries forms the landscape diversity as a field mosaic. The use of ferti-
lizer as well as buffer strips affect the interaction of arable land with the sur-
rounding ecosystems and the diversity of wild species and, hence, agro-
biodiversity. It should be noted that, while the choice of the land area devoted
to each crop is a land allocation problem, the choice of the buffer strip size in
each parcel is an input use problem.
The privately optimal use of inputs and land allocation create a market solution
for nutrient runoffs and, through the landscape mosaic, for agrobiodiversity as
well. This private solution is compared to the socially optimal way of produc-
ing both commodity and non-commodity outputs. The use of inputs and land
allocation that maximises social welfare from multifunctional agriculture is
then solved in a parametric model.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Chapter 3.2 formulates a model
of crop production with endogenous land allocation to different crops and stud-
ies the properties of private agricultural production. Based on the description
of the diversity valuation and runoff functions, the socially optimal
multifunctional production is developed in Chapter 3.3. Chapter 3.4 provides a
3 For an analysis of land allocation, see e.g. Orazem and Miranowski 1994, Shah et al. 1995,
Plantinga 1996, Hardie and Parks 1997, Miller and Plantinga 1999.46
numerical application of the analytical model for characterising socially optimal
multifunctional agriculture. Findings are summarised in Chapter 3.5.
3.2 The model of crop production
Consider a watershed with a single river running through it and agricultural land
bordering this stream (see Figure 3). For analytical convenience the river is
treated as a straight line. Next, the agricultural land in this watershed is divided
into production units, rectangular parcels with the same width and length, each
of which having an edge along the stream and each extending perpendicularly
away from the stream. The nutrients running off from each parcel are assumed
to move in a straight line toward the stream. Finally, the size of each parcel is
normalised to 1 unit (hectare) of the land area.
Next, land quality is added to the spatial arrangement of land in the watershed.
Let us consider a representative farm, which has a fixed amount of arable land
(G) available for agricultural production. The land quality depends on physi-
cal, chemical, and biological factors, such as soil erosion, soil acidity (pH),
and soil organic matter. Following Lichtenberg (1989), it is assumed that the
variation in land quality can be ranked by a scalar measure q, with the scale
chosen so that minimal land quality is zero and maximal land quality is one,
that is,  1 0 ≤ ≤ q . Thus, G(q) is the cumulative distribution of q (acreage hav-
ing quality q at most), while g(q) is its density. For analytical convenience it is
assumed that g(q) is continuous and differentiable.
(3.1) ∫ =
1
0
) ( dq q g G
It is assumed that the farmer wishes to allocate his arable land between two
cereal crops, crop 1 and crop 2, and the shares of land devoted to them are
denoted by  1 L  and  2 L , defined as  ∫ = =
1
0
1 1 ) ( ) (
q
q G dq q g L  and
∫ − = =
1
1 2
1
) ( ) 1 ( ) (
q
q G G dq q g L ,  where G(1) = N and denotes the total amount
of land. Production exhibits constant returns to land of any given quality but is
neoclassical with respect to inputs and land quality. Production of crops re-
quires the use of fertilizer input l.4
4 The model would easily allow the use of many inputs, such as labour and capital, but they are
not crucial for the present analysis and so they are ignored.47
Figure 3 describes the spatial structure, the “landscape mosaic”, of the multi-
functional framework (the concept of landscape mosaic is discussed more
closely in Chapter 3.3). The land is divided into uniform rectangular parcels
and land quality improves from left to right.
Next, an additional type of land use problem is introduced into the model. In
Chapter 4 it is assumed that the government pays a subsidy to the farmer for
the arable land allocated to a buffer strip to be established between the field
and a water body. In order to get the buffer strip subsidy, the farmer has to
establish a buffer strip on each parcel (see Figure 5 in Chapter 3.2.2).
The focus in the present chapter is on the private and social optimum in the
absence of government intervention. However, for presentational convenience
(that is, to avoid repeating analytical steps) the comparative statics of input use
and land allocation for fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy that will be needed
later in Chapter 4 are also solved here.
The model has a recursive structure allowing it to be solved in separate stages.
Thus, the model is solved in three stages: (1) optimal fertilizer intensity on
land of given quality q and crop i; (2) optimal buffer strip size on land of qual-
ity q and crop i given fertilizer intensity (and thus short-run profit) on crop i;
and (3) optimal land allocation.
Figure 3. The spatial properties of agricultural landscape.
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3.2.1 Input use
In the two first stages the farmer takes the land allocation between the two
crops as given. In the first stage he chooses the fertilizer intensity (l) for land of
given quality q and crop i. Then, in the second stage, the farmer chooses the
proportion of the land of quality q and crop i to be allocated to a buffer strip
(m), given the fertilizer intensity on crop i. Due to the internal homogeneity of
each parcel, production is linear in m. Finally, production also depends posi-
tively on land quality q so that agricultural productivity is greater when land
quality is higher. Thus, production per each parcel for both crops can be ex-
pressed as
(3.2) ) ; ( ) 1 ( q l f m y i
i
i i − =      for  i = 1,25
This production function is assumed to be concave in the use of fertilizer, that is
0 ; 0 < > ll l f f ,  (subscripts denote partial derivatives).
Next, the corresponding per parcel profit function is developed. The farmer
takes the prices of crops pi and fertilizer c as given. The government intervenes
in agriculture through two environmentally motivated policy instruments, a fer-
tilizer tax and a buffer strip subsidy. A basic level of tax t is levied on the use of
fertilizers so that the after-tax price of fertilizer is  ) 1 ( t c c + =
∗ . The basic level
of subsidy on buffer strips is denoted by b(mi), and to solve for comparative
statics it is defined as  i i i m m m b ) ( ) ( 2
1 λ λ − = . Thus, the subsidy is decreasing in
m, which reflects the decreasing ability of wider buffer strips to further reduce
runoff and increase species diversity. The per parcel formulation adopted here
allows either a uniform (such as the basic levels of the instruments discussed
above) or differentiated tax and subsidy. In the case of differentiated instru-
ments, the tax and subsidy rates are differentiated according to crop and parcel.
In other words, the policy incentives are fine-tuned with respect to heterogene-
ous land quality. With uniform instruments a constant per-unit tax on fertilizer
and a constant subsidy for buffer strips are implemented irrespective of hetero-
geneous conditions. Later on in Chapter 4, it will be examined whether a differ-
entiated or a uniform tax and subsidy are socially optimal. Moreover, it is as-
sumed that the ability of buffer strips to prevent runoffs and promote
agrobiodiversity is independent of land quality. The farmer’s problem is to choose
the inputs,  i l  and  i m  so as to maximise the short-run profit per parcel:6
5 To avoid complex notation parcels are not indexed, but naturally equation (3.2) and other per
parcel equations hold for every parcel.
6 The following terminology is adopted: “fertilizer intensity” refers to  i l, while ”fertilizer used
per parcel” refers to  i i l m ) 1 ( − .49
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The first-order conditions for the optimal solution are
(3.4a) 0 = − =
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and require that the value of the marginal product of input use equals their
respective costs. Because the productivity of each parcel differs due to q, the
optimal fertilizer intensity and the size of the buffer strip differ in every parcel
as well (see Figure 5).
The second-order conditions are given in equations (3.5a) to (3.5d)
(3.5a) 0 < =
i
l l i
i
l l i i i i f p π
(3.5b) 0 < − = λ π
i
m m i i
(3.5c)
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i
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(3.5d) 0
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where  is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of the second-order partial
derivatives. Since the principal minors are  0 1 < H and  0 2 > H , the Hessian
matrix is negative definite and the solution maximises profit (see e.g. Chiang
1984). Given that the second-order conditions hold, the comparative statics
can be solved from the first-order conditions by differentiating them with re-
spect to the exogenous parameters and applying the Cramer’s Rule (see also
equations (A1.4a) and (A1.4b) in Appendix 1).
The effects of a change in the price of cereal are given by (3.6a) and (3.6b)
(3.6a) {} 0
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The effects of a change in the price of fertilizer are given by (3.7a) and (3.7b)
(3.7a) {} 0 ) 1 (
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The effects of a fertilizer tax are given by (3.8a) and (3.8b)
(3.8a) {}0
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Finally, the effects of a buffer strip subsidy are given by (3.9a) and (3.9b)
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The comparative statics of the model are condensed to (see also Appendix 1)
(3.10) ) , t , c , p (  l   l i i i 0 λ
− − +
=    and    ) , t , c p ( m m i i i
+ + + −
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Hence, as regards market and policy parameters we have
Result 1. For internally homogenous parcels, a higher output (input) price
increases (decreases) fertilizer intensity and decreases (increases) the size of
buffer strips. A higher fertilizer tax decreases fertilizer intensity and increases
the size of buffer strips. A higher buffer strip subsidy increases the size of buffer
strips, but does not affect the fertilizer intensity.
Result 1 is quite logical. The effects of the market parameters and the own
effects of the policy parameters are conventional: a higher output (input) price
increases (decreases) the profitability of fertilizer use and increases (decreases)
the opportunity cost of buffer strips, a tax decreases the profitability of ferti-
lizer use, and a subsidy increases the marginal revenue from buffer strips. The
cross-effects of the policy parameters are asymmetrical, because a fertilizer tax
decreases the opportunity cost of buffer strips while a higher subsidy for buffer51
strips does not change the marginal profitability of fertilizer use. Moreover, for a
given fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy rate, the use of fertilizer is greater
and the size of the buffer strip is smaller for the crop that is grown on higher
quality parcels.
In the absence of government intervention, the private solution results in the
first-order conditions  0 = − = c f p
i
l i
i
l i i π  and  0 ) ; ( ≤ + − = i i
i
i
i
m cl q l f p
i π .
Thus, without a buffer strip subsidy, the optimal level of buffer strips is zero
from the farmer’s viewpoint. This is because the foregone value of cultivating
the cereal exceeds the savings in fertilizer costs, wherefore establishing buffer
strips would result in a net loss of income. Moreover, the fertilizer intensity is
higher in the absence of a fertilizer tax.
3.2.2 Land allocation
Following Lichtenberg (1989), it is assumed that the lowest quality parcels are
better suited for crop 1, which has a lower fertilizer intensity than crop 2. Lower
quality parcels are thus allocated to crop 1. The proportion of land of quality q
allocated to crop 1 is denoted by  ) ( 1 q L . The farmer maximises the sum of
restricted profit functions 
∗
i π , i = 1,2 by allocating his land between both crops,
that is,
(3.11) [] ∫ − +
∗ ∗
1
0
1 2 1 1
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) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( max
1
dq q g q L q L
q L
π π
The first-order condition for optimal land allocation is
(3.12) 0 ) , , , , ( ) , , , , ( 2 2 1 1 ≤ −
∗ ∗ λ π λ π t c p q t c p q
This first-order condition leads to a corner solution for every homogenous par-
cel in the given acreage with differential land quality. Thus, if
) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 q q
∗ ∗ < > π π , then all land of quality q is allocated to crop 1 (crop 2). In
order to ensure that it is optimal to cultivate both crops in the given acreage the
following assumptions are made. In order to assure that crop 1 is cultivated on
land of quality  1 0 q q < ≤  and crop 2 on land of quality  1 1 ≤ ≤ q q , so that
there is only a single crossing of restricted profits, assumptions have to be made
concerning how profits relate to land quality. It is first assumed that restricted
profits are higher for crop 1 in lower quality parcels. Second, the restricted
profits are higher for crop  2 in the highest land quality
) , , , , 1 ( ) , , , , 1 ( 1 1 2 2 λ π λ π t c p t c p
∗ ∗ >  and restricted profits as a function of land52
quality increase more rapidly for crop 2 for all land of quality q as indicated by
the fact that 
1 2
q q π π > . These assumptions assure that there is a single unique q1
and each crop will be cultivated on a unique, compact range of land qualities
(see Figure 4). This is assumed to hold in the following.
The comparative statics of land allocation can be solved as follows. Following
Lichtenberg (1989), if crop 1 is cultivated on lower quality parcels, the acre-
age allocated to it is given by  ) ( ) ( 1
0
1
1
q G dq q g L
q
= = ∫ , where the critical qual-
ity, q1, is determined by  ) , , , , ( ) , , , , ( 2 1 2 1 1 1 λ π λ π t c p q t c p q
∗ ∗ = . Then the acre-
age allocated for crop 2 is  ) ( ) 1 ( 1 2 q G G L − = .  Let  represent the exogenous
variables, that is,  ) , , , ( λ θ t c pi = . To solve for 
∂θ
∂ 1 q , equation (3.12) that de-
fines the critical value q1 is totally differentiated to get
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From equation (3.13) we can develop an appropriate expression for each 
∂θ
∂ 1 q .
Using the Leibnitz rule (see e.g. Taylor and Mann 1983) and accounting for the
fact that the derivative of the upper integration limit is defined by the condition
Figure 4. A single crossing of restricted profits at the unique value of land qual-
ity q1.
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defining the critical value q1, changes in the land allocated for crop 1 are given
by 
θ θ ∂
∂
=
∂
∂ 1
1
1 ) (
q
q g
L . The comparative statics of  2 L  are simply given by
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∂
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∂
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2 ) (
q
q g
L
.
Let us recall from equations (3.4a) and (3.4b) and the subsequent discussion
that crop 1 is cultivated on lower quality parcels with a lower fertilizer inten-
sity and larger buffer strips, so that  1 2 l l > , but  1 2 m m < .
The effect of a price increase of crop 1 on land allocation is given by
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The effect of a price increase of crop 2 on land allocation is given by
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The effect of a fertilizer price increase on land allocation is given by
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These effects of end prices and input costs on land allocation are already famil-
iar from Lichtenberg (1989). The effects of agri-environmental policy instru-
ments are as follows.
The effect of a buffer strip subsidy on land allocation is
(3.17a) []
0
) ( ) ( ) (
) (
2
2 2
1
2
2
1 2
1
1 1 1 >
∆
− − − −
=
+            
m m m m q g L
∂λ
∂
(3.17b) []
0
) ( ) ( ) (
) (
2
2 2
1
2
2
1 2
1
1 1 2 <
∆
− − −
=
+            
m m m m q g L
∂λ
∂
For the effect of a fertilizer tax we get
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The effects of exogenous parameters on land allocation are summarised in
(3.19)
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As regards the agri-environmental policy instruments, we have
Result 2.   Both fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy shift land into the
production of the less fertilizer-intensive crop.
Logically, a higher fertilizer tax decreases the application of fertilizers in the
production of both crops, and given our assumptions concerning land quality,
makes some parcels of crop 2 less profitable relative to crop 1. The same hap-
pens with higher input prices. Consequently, the farmer shifts more land to the
production of crop 1, which uses fertilizers less intensively. An increase in the
buffer strip subsidy increases the size of buffer strips in both production lines,
but more so in the production of crop 1, thus shifting additional parcels to
crop 1. Hence, in the absence of government intervention, the farmer allocates
more land into the production of the more fertilizer-intensive crop 2.
Figure 5 shows how the landscape is structured by land allocation between the
two crops and by the use of inputs, namely the buffer strips. With a given basic
level of buffer strip subsidy all parcels contain a buffer strip, but its width
differs across parcels due to differences in agricultural productivity. Naturally,
field boundaries are a crucial part of this landscape. Given, however, that they
remain the same throughout the analysis, these are not explicitly accounted for.
Changes in the exogenous parameters (crop prices, fertilizer costs, and govern-
Figure 5. Land allocation and optimal buffer strip area  in each parcel.
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ment instruments) transform the composition and configuration of this landscape
mosaic by inducing adjustments in crop selection and buffer strips that are indi-
cated by arrows in Figure 5. (cf. Eiden et al. 2000).7
3.3 Socially optimal provision of multifunctional
outputs
Let us assume that society wishes to promote multifunctional agriculture and
regards the aesthetic value of diverse agricultural landscapes, agrobiodiversity,
and surface water quality as the most important non-commodity outputs. De-
signing socially optimal multifunctional agriculture requires that we first de-
fine how landscape diversity, agrobiodiversity, and nutrient runoffs are related
to the commodity production.
3.3.1 Agricultural diversity and runoff functions
How do people value diversity in agriculture? Studies concerning people’s at-
titudes and valuation allow us to make the following three observations. First,
there are typically some site-specific features, such as uneven terrain or lake
areas, that together with the agricultural land mosaic are the most important
sources of landscape aesthetics (see e.g. Dillman and Bergstrom 1991). Sec-
ond, landscape valuation is often also related to species diversity, for instance,
through the preservation of old domestic plant and animal species (see e.g.
Drake 1992). Third, people show increasing awareness concerning the effects
of the use of chemical inputs on the surrounding ecosystems and on species
diversity (see e.g. Siikamäki 1997).
The effects of agricultural production practices on the surrounding ecosystems
and on species diversity can also be assessed from an ecological angle. Kleijn
(1997), Wossink et al. (1999), and Bäckman et al. (1999) show that in arable
fields the largest number of species of both flora and fauna are to be found at
the field boundary. Field boundaries provide forage, shelter, reproduction and
over-wintering sites, and ecological corridors for wildlife, thus belonging to
the most important semi-natural habitats sustained by agriculture. Field
boundaries and buffer strips support many flowering plants and insects, such
as butterflies and bees, which are important for bird species, and provide im-
portant habitats for pest predators, but also for weeds and insects (Swifth and
7 An alternative spatial description would be one where land quality improves along with the
distance from the shore. In this case, a buffer strip would be established only on the lowest
quality parcels next to the water body, and the rest of the parcels would be allocated between
crop 1 and crop 2.57
Anderson 1994). Hence, in addition to promoting species diversity and reducing
sediment, nutrient and pesticide runoffs, they may have both positive and nega-
tive agronomic effects.8
The agricultural landscape mosaic can be described by different indices, such
as the edge density index, the Shannon Diversity Index, and the Interspersion
and Juxtaposition Index, which capture the number and distribution of differ-
ent patches in the landscape (see e.g. Eiden et al. 2000). These indices are
linked to landscape diversity by Eiden et al. (2000), but they could also be made
to apply to the overall diversity comprising both landscape diversity and agro-
biodiversity. For example, Duelli  (1997) proposes a conceptual “mosaic”
model in which biodiversity evaluation is based on structural landscape param-
eters, such as habitat diversity and landscape heterogeneity, and functionally
on metacommunity dynamics. This approach links site-specific biodiversity es-
timates to the spatial heterogeneity of the landscape mosaic (for a comprehen-
sive treatment of the landscape mosaic see e.g. Forman 1995). In the present
study the Shannon Diversity Index is used in the empirical analysis as a proxy
for landscape diversity. The analysis of agrobiodiversity is based on Ma et al.
(2002), and estimates of floral species richness as a function of the buffer strip
area are given.
In the theoretical analysis a general description of people’s diversity valuation
is applied. The choice of crops is linked to landscape valuation. For brevity
this is called landscape diversity valuation. Then agrobiodiversity is expressed
as a function of fertilizer use and buffer strips. This part of the overall diversity
is called agrobiodiversity valuation. Hence, the description of the diversity
valuation function in this study is a product of “landscape diversity” and “agro-
biodiversity”. This multiplicative form of the diversity valuation function re-
flects the fact that in order for diversity to have a non-zero value, both of its
components must have non-zero values.
(3.20) ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 l m h L L k = Ω
where  l  refers to the total amount of the fertilizer used
∫ − + − =
1
0
2 2 2 1 1 1 ) ( ) ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( )) ( 1 (( dq q g L q l q m L q l q m l , and m to the total
8 In the absence of buffer strip management, that is, mowing and removing of the cuttings, the
nutrient content of the buffer strip increases, counter-affecting agrobiodiversity promotion.
A higher nutrient status reduces botanical species-richness, and thereby the abundance and
diversity of wildlife in buffer strips. The reason for this is the tighter competition for light,
which leads to the displacement of shorter species by taller species (Tilman 1993, Kleijn and
Snoeijing 1997). This adverse effect may even be more severe than that of herbicide applica-
tions (Kleijn and Snoeijing 1997).58
area of the buffer strips  ∫ + =
1
0
2 2 1 1 ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ( dq q g L q m L q m m , and L1, L2 are
defined in equation (3.1). The term  ) , ( 2 1 L L k  indicates the valuation of land-
scape diversity as a function of land allocation to different crops, and the latter
term  ) , ( l m h  indicates the valuation of agrobiodiversity as a function of input
use. Via L1 , L2 , m and l , the diversity valuation function also depends on land
quality. It is assumed that increasing the acreage for each crop increases land-
scape diversity but in a diminishing way, that is,  0 1 > k  and  0 2 > k , but  0 11 < k
and  0 22 < k .9 For the use of fertilizer input it is assumed that  0 < l h  and
0 < l l h , indicating that the higher the amount of fertilizer used the greater the
loss in agrobiodiversity. Finally, increasing the size of the aggregate buffer strip
area increases agrobiodiversity by enlarging the field boundary but with de-
creasing returns, that is,  0 > m h  and   0 < mm h  (this is confirmed e.g. by Ma et al.
2002).
The runoff of nutrients (kg) from each parcel can be expressed as a function of
fertilizer intensity  i l  and the size of the buffer strip  i m  as follows:
)) ( ), ( ( q m q l v z i i i i = ; for i = 1,2, where  ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( q l q m q l i i i − =  with
0 , 0 > > l l l v v  and  0 , 0 > < mm m v v . Thus, the runoff function is convex in the
fertilizer application but concave in buffer strips (for the former see e.g.
Simmelsgaard 1991, and for the latter Uusi-Kämppä et al. 2000). The total
amount of runoff from the land area devoted to crop 1 and crop 2 can be de-
scribed as
(3.21) [] ∫ − + =
1
0
1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 ) ( ) 1 ))( ( ), ( ( )) ( ), ( ( dq q g L q m q l v L q m q l v z
3.3.2 Command optimum
Let us now turn to the determination of the socially optimal solution for
multifunctional agriculture as a command optimum in the absence of taxes and
9 These are ceteris paribus assumptions. Given the definition of  1 L  and  2 L , and the fixed
amount of arable land, the effects of land allocation on the marginal landscape valuation will
depend on the difference between the marginal valuations,  2 1 k k − , as will be seen later on.59
subsidies (see e.g. Weitzman 1974 for social planner’s problem in general and
Lichtenberg 2000 in the context of agriculture). The command optimum means
that a social planner determines the optimal use of inputs for all parcels, as
well as the land allocation between the crops. It is assumed that the govern-
ment maximises the producers’ surplus augmented with diversity valuation and
the damage from nutrient runoffs. Society values diversity,  ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 l m h L L k ,
but derives disutility from the nutrient runoffs. The runoff damage function
) (z d  is convex, that is,  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ d  and  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′′ d . Thus, the social welfare func-
tion can be expressed as
(3.22) ) , ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ) 1 ( ( 2 1 2 1 1
1
0
1 l m h L L k z d dq q g L L SW + − − + = ∫ π π
The command optimum is solved recursively. Choosing the use of inputs for
each parcel so as to maximise (3.22) yields
(3.23a) 0 ) ( ) ( ' = ⋅ +
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According to (3.23a), in each parcel fertilizer is used up to the point where the
value of its marginal product is equal to its unit price, adjusted for its marginal
effects on runoffs and agrobiodversity. The marginal damage of runoffs com-
prises two components, a constant marginal damage term multiplied with mar-
ginal runoffs from fertilizer used in each parcel. Note that marginal runoffs
vary across land quality because li and mi do. The marginal agrobiodiversity
effect is constant over parcels. The buffer strip size is optimal when the net
loss of income due to decreased production equals the marginal value from
runoff reduction (varying over parcels) and the constant marginal benefits from
agrobiodiversity promotion (3.23b). Note that the choice of the width of the
buffer strip clearly differs across parcels, causing the fertilizer used per parcel
to do so, too. This has an interesting implication. Runoff no longer depends
solely on the amount of fertilizer used, since the vegetation on the buffer strip
removes nutrients from the runoff. The wider the buffer strip the greater is this
nutrient uptake. Let us recall the private per parcel solution in the absence of
taxes and subsidies, that is,  0 = − = c f p
i
l i
i
l i π  and
0 ) ; ( ≤ + − = i i
i
i
i
m cl q l f p π . Thus, the private solution neglects the effects
on the production of public goods and on runoff damage. While the use of the60
fertilizer input is excessive, the use of buffer strips is too small from the view-
point of society. In fact, in the absence of incentives provided by society, the
privately optimal area of buffer strips is zero.
The social planner maximises (3.22) by allocating land to crops 1 and 2, and
accounting for the effects of land allocation on diversity and nutrient runoffs.
Due to uniform land quality within each parcel, a corner solution is obtained
where each parcel is allocated to the crop with the highest social return. Re-
calling the assumptions from Chapter 3.2, there will be only a single crossing
of social rent curves, and thus a single unique value of land quality dividing the
area into a unique, compact range of land qualities for both crops defined by
(3.24)
2 1 2 2 1 1 ) ( ) ( L L v d v d Ω + ⋅ ′ − = Ω + ⋅ ′ −
∗ ∗ π π 10
Comparing this with the privately optimal solution, where 
∗ ∗ = 2 1 π π , reveals
the difference. In addition to maximum profits, the land allocation will depend
on the marginal valuation of the diversity benefits and runoff damages. Conse-
quently, the socially optimal land allocation, as determined also by the mar-
ginal valuation of the diversity benefits and runoff damages, shifts more land
to crop 1, which uses fertilizer less intensively, has larger buffer strips and thus
produces a higher level of diversity.
Summing up, it has been shown that
Proposition 1. Socially optimal multifunctional agriculture promotes land-
scape diversity and agrobiodiversity, as well as surface water protection by
reducing the use of the polluting fertilizer input, increasing the size of buffer
strips and increasing the mosaic pattern of fields relative to privately optimal
agricultural production.
Figure 6 illustrates how socially optimal multifunctional agriculture changes
the landscape relative to the landscape emerging from the privately optimal
solution.
Socially optimal multifunctional agriculture implies that a buffer strip, with
decreasing size in land quality, is established on each parcel, while the private
market solution (without a buffer strip subsidy) does not entail buffer strips.
Relative to the private optimum, the socially optimal solution shifts more land to
crop 1, which uses fertilizer less intensively. Hence, the socially optimal land-
10The partial derivatives are  1 1 1 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( m h k l h k h k L L L ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ = Ω  and
2 2 2 2 2 2 ) ( ) ( ) ( m h k l h k h k L L L ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ = Ω61
scape sustains higher agrobiodiversity and landscape diversity, as well as lower
nutrient runoffs, than the private optimum.
Correcting the privately optimal use of inputs and land allocation to reflect
the socially optimal multifunctional agriculture requires an appropriate use of
policy instruments. The socially optimal rates of these instruments are solved
in Chapter 4. Now let us turn to the numerical characterisation of the socially
optimal multifunctional agriculture.
3.4 Numerical characterisation of multifunctional
agriculture
This section illustrates in a parametric model the analytical approach to
multifunctional agriculture. The basic features of the socially optimal
multifunctional agriculture are determined using Finnish data. The private op-
timum in the absence of policy instruments as a market solution is solved first,
followed by the social optimum as a command optimum. After this the pri-
vately optimal solution is compared with the command optimum in terms of
input use, production, short-run profits, nitrogen runoffs, and diversity, for
which two measures are offered, floral species richness (agrobiodiversity) and
the Shannon Diversity Index (landscape diversity). Finally, social welfare out-
comes under these two solutions are calculated.
Figure 6. The privately and socially optimal buffer strips and land allocation.
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3.4.1 Parametric model
Following the analytical model, let us start with the farmer’s production function
and apply a quadratic nitrogen response function with parameters estimated for
barley (crop 1) and wheat (crop 2) in clay soils by Bäckman et al. (1997).
(3.25)
2
i i i i i i l l a y β α + + =      for  i = 1,2
where yi = yield response, kg/ha
ai = intercept parameter
li = nitrogen fertilizer intensity, kg/ha
i ,i = parameters, α i > 0, i < 0
Land quality q is continuous and incorporated through the intercept parameter
ai and response parameter i , both of which are concave in land quality:
(3.26)
2
2 1 0 2
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q n q n n a
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− + =
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q q
q q
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− + =
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In (3.26), e0 and n0 are the lowest levels of natural productivity, ai, e1 and n1 are
the slopes of the natural productivity change, e2 and n2 are concavity terms, and
q is land quality (increasing from 1 to 60).11 For the response parameter i, we
denote the basic levels by 0 and 0, the slopes by 1 and 1, and the concavity
terms by  and 2.
The farmer’s short-run profits per parcel for crop i in the absence of govern-
ment intervention are given by
(3.27) [ ] i i i i i i i i i
i l m c l l a m p ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 − − + + − = β α π      for  i = 1,2
where ai and i are defined by (3.23).
Next a parametric description of the environmental parts of the social welfare
function, namely the runoff damage and diversity valuation, is developed. The
nitrogen leakage function used is (Simmelsgaard 1991)
(3.28) ) exp( ) ( 0 i n i bN b y N y + =      for  i = 1,2
11Parcel size in the parametric model is one hectare. Total acreage in the model is 60 hectares,
resulting in 60 parcels.63
where y(Ni) = nitrogen leakage at fertilizer intensity level Ni, kg/ha, yn = nitro-
gen leakage at average nitrogen use, b0 = a constant (<0), b = a parameter
(>0), and Ni = nitrogen fertilization relative to the normal fertilizer intensity for
the crop, 0.5 ≤ N  1.5. The reductive effect of the buffer strip on the nitrogen
runoff zi is incorporated as follows
(3.29) ) ( ) 1 ( i i i N y jrm z − =     for  i = 1,2
where j = share of surface runoff in total (surface and drainage) runoff, r =
nitrogen removal effectiveness of the buffer strip, and m is the size of the buffer
strip (recall that given the size and shape of each parcel, m unambiguously
defines the width of the buffer strip).
Based on Finnish experimental studies on grass buffer strips (Uusi-Kämppä
and Yläranta 1992, 1996) and on the leaching of nitrogen (Turtola and Jaakkola
1987, Turtola and Puustinen 1998), the following assumptions are made. Of
the total nitrogen load, 50% is surface runoff. A 10-meter-wide grass buffer
strip is able to reduce 50% of the total nitrogen of this surface runoff. Moreo-
ver, since combined surface and drainage nitrogen leakages (yn) at the fertiliza-
tion level of 100 kg N/ha have been in the order of 10–20 kg N/ha in Finnish
experimental studies, the parameter yn is set at the value of 15.12
For the social value of runoff damages an estimate provided by Vehkasalo
(1999) is used. He approximated the social benefits of reducing nitrogen
runoffs from Finnish agriculture by applying the averting expenditure valua-
tion method, and estimated the costs of a corresponding nitrogen reduction at
municipal wastewater treatment facilities. The cost estimate is FIM 9.5 per re-
duced kg of nitrogen (for a 10–20% reduction).13 The diversity valuation for
this study is taken from Aakkula (1999), which suggests an average WTP/ha of
FIM 466 as an estimate for the economic value of pro-environmental farming in
Finland.14 However, besides landscape diversity and agrobiodiversity, this esti-
mate also includes the value of nutrient runoff reduction. Therefore, the esti-
mate of FIM 340 per hectare is used, which is 27% lower than Aakkula’s aver-
age WTP.15 Moreover, Aakkula’s estimate is the sum of both components of
12We are obligated to use Finnish parameters in a Danish leakage function, because no estima-
tions for a Finnish leakage function are available despite the leaching experiments made in
Finland. However, the Danish leakage function was estimated for sandy and clay soils culti-
vated by barley and wheat, and the Finnish leaching experiments also took place on clay soils
cultivated by barley and wheat. Thus, data from these two sources can be reasonably com-
bined.
13FIM 1= 0.1682 euro.
14More precisely, Aakkula used the contingent valuation method to elicit a monetary value for
the conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming.
15This 27% (FIM 126) reduction is in the range of Vehkasalo’s runoff damage estimates per
hectare (between FIM 95 and 190 when runoffs range between 10 and 20 kg N/ha).64
diversity (landscape diversity and agrobiodiversity) and their separate values
cannot be detached from that estimate. Therefore, the diversity valuation esti-
mate is linked to buffer strip areas which contribute to both diversity types (see
the empirical diversity indices below). The runoff damage and agrobiodiversity
valuation parts of social welfare are thus given by
(3.30)
08 . 0 340 5 . 9 i i m z +     for  i = 1,2
where  ) ( ) 1 ( i i i N y jrm z − = , and y(Ni) is defined in (3.28) and (3.29), and the
exponent 0.08 in the last term calibrates the valuation to Finnish levels.
After obtaining the privately and socially optimal solutions for input use and
land allocation, the following diversity indices are calculated on the basis of
buffer strip areas and crop areas.
Agrobiodiversity valuation is linked to species diversity with the help of Ma
et al. (2002), who use Finnish data to investigate the relationship between the
buffer strip area and floral species richness. Ma et al. revised the conventional
species-area relationship for buffer strips by describing buffer strip area as the
product of length (L) and width (W). Their modified species-area model is
β α ϕ ϕ ψ W L S = , where  α ϕ ( B ϕ ) is an estimate for the average change in species
richness due to an increase in the length (width) of the area while keeping the
width (length) of the area constant. Ma et al. (2002) estimated the coefficients
to be the following:  6331 . 1 = ψ ,  0009 . 0 = α ϕ , and  0977 . 0 = β ϕ . Thus, one
can produce a higher number of floral species with a per unit area increment by
widening rather than lengthening the buffer strips.
In general terms, the spatial structure of landscape is associated with the com-
position (variety and abundance) and configuration (distribution or spatial char-
acter) of different patch types within the landscape, and a number of math-
ematical indices have been developed for describing it (see McGarigal and
Marks 1994). The Shannon Diversity Index (SHDI) is used as a measure of
landscape diversity, as it works well when there is no temporal variation in the
number of patch types and total area. The Shannon Diversity Index (SHDI) is
calculated for the reference area by summing over all patch types the product
of the proportion of the each patch type multiplied by the natural logarithm of
that proportion,
(3.31) ∑
=
− =
n
i
i i P P SHDI
1
) ln * (    for  i = 1,2,3,465
where n = number of patch types and Pi = the proportion of the area covered
by patch type i out of the four patches in the model. The SHDI is a combination
of the richness (number of different patch types) and evenness (proportional
area distribution among patch types) of the landscape diversity. The SHDI is
zero when a landscape contains only one patch, and the value increases with
the number of patch types and/or as the proportional distribution of the area
among patch types becomes more equal (Eiden et al. 2000).
Table 4. Parameter values in the numerical application.
Parameter Symbol Value
Price of barley p1 FIM 0.73/kg
Price of wheat p2 FIM 0.83/kg
Price of nitrogen fertilizer c FIM 5.95/kg
Concavity of the slope parameter  (*)
Basic level of response for crop 1 0 52.9
Basic level of response for crop 2 0 35.8
Slope of the response change for crop 1 1 0.005
Slope of the response change for crop 2 1 0.005
Concavity term for crop 1 2  0.00004
Concavity term for crop 2 2 0.00004
Parameter of quadratic nitrogen response function  -0.173 for barley
-0.094 for wheat
Concavity of the intercept parameter a (*)
Basic level of productivity for crop 1 e0 800
Basic level of productivity for crop 2 n0 780
Slope of the productivity change for crop 1 e1 10
Slope of the productivity change for crop 2 n1 23
Concavity term for crop 1 e2 0.07
Concavity term for crop 2 n2 0.15
Share of surface runoff in total runoff j 0.5 (i.e. 50%)
Nitrogen removal effectiveness of buffer strip r  0.5 (i.e. 50%)
Nitrogen leakage at average nitrogen use yn 10-20 kg/ha
Parameter of leakage function b 0.7
Constant parameter of leakage function b0 -0.7
Parameters of species-area relationship
Species diversity in initial area  1.6331
The coefficient of length increase 	 0.0009
The coefficient of width increase  0.0977
Note: Prices are from 1999 (FIM 1 = 0.1682 euro). The price of nitrogen is calculated on the
basis of a compound NPK fertilizer.
(*) The estimated, average constants for these crops are a1 = 1010 for barley and a2 = 1274 for
wheat. The response parameter a is 52.9 for barley and 35.8 for wheat (Bäckman et al. 1997).66
Parameter values are reported in Table 4. The arable land area is assumed to
be 60 hectares. By assumption the width of the field area (i.e. the distance from
the water border to the other edge of each parcel) is 500 m and the length (i.e.
the border along the waterway) is 1200 m. Moreover, given the same width and
the length of each parcel the share of land allocated to buffer strip m defines
uniquely the area and the width of buffer strip (in meters). For example if buffer
strip size is 0.005 hectares its width is 2.5 meters and if the size is 0.01 then the
width is 5 meters etc.
3.4.2 Numerical solutions
The calibrated model is solved using Mathematica and Excel. Input use, land
allocation, restricted profits, and social welfare (social returns) are first solved
by using Mathematica. Next, these solutions are used for calculating produc-
tion, nitrogen runoffs, floral species richness, and the Shannon Diversity Index
in Excel. The solution technique is as follows (see Appendix 5 for sample equa-
tions of the calibrated model). First, the farmer’s privately optimal fertilizer
intensity is solved in each parcel for both crops. This is done by taking the
first-order conditions from equations (A5.1a) and (A5.1b) in Appendix 5 with
respect to fertilizer use and then solving for the optimal fertilizer intensity in
each parcel for both crops. In the absence of policy instruments (that is, with-
out a buffer strip subsidy) the privately optimal width of buffer strips is zero.
Given the optimal fertilizer intensity for each parcel, the profits for both crops
in each parcel are obtained and the optimal land allocation between the crops
can be determined. Socially optimal input use for both crops in each parcel is
solved from equations (A5.2a) and (A5.2b) in Appendix 5. This is done by
taking the first-order conditions with respect to fertilizer use and buffer strips
and then solving for the socially optimal fertilizer intensity and buffer strip
width for both crops in each parcel. Given the socially optimal input use, the
social returns are obtained and socially optimal land allocation can be deter-
mined.
Hence, the private optimum in the absence of government intervention is solved
first, followed by the social optimum as a command optimum. Tables 5 and 6
present some of the results. Table 5 presents land allocation, the average use of
inputs, and the average production per hectare under these two solutions.
The farmer’s private optimum allocates 23 hectares for crop 1 (barley) and 37
hectares for crop 2 (wheat). The average nitrogen use is 129.5 kg/ha for crop 1
and 153.0 kg/ha for crop 2. The optimal rate of nitrogen application differs
between parcels as the nitrogen response differs because of heterogeneous land
quality. In the private optimum the fertilizer intensity and the amount of ferti-
lizer used per parcel coincide, since in the absence of a buffer strip subsidy the67
optimal amount of buffer strips is zero for the farmer. Average production per
hectare is 4,863 kg for crop 1 and  4,762 kg for crop 2.
As Table 5 and Figure 7 show, the socially optimal land allocation differs from
the private optimum since land allocation is, in addition to short-run profits,
also a function of the valuation of diversity benefits and runoff damages. Thus,
it is socially optimal to allocate a greater share of land for crop 1, which uses
nitrogen fertilizer less intensively. Indeed, the difference between the privately
and socially optimal solution predominantly results from the fact that crop 2
implies higher runoff damages due to higher application of nitrogen fertilizer
and smaller buffer strips. Expectedly, the use of fertilizer in each parcel is
smaller under the social optimum than in the private solution. This holds even
more clearly for buffer strips, for which the private solution provides a zero
size. The production of crops per hectare decreases in the social optimum rela-
tive to the private solution because of the lower level of nitrogen application
and because of the presence of buffer strips.
Table 5. Land allocation, average input use and average production under al-
ternative solutions.
Land allocation, Nitrogen use, Buffer strip size, Production,
ha kg ha kg/ha
Crop 1 Crop 2 Crop 1 Crop 2 Crop 1 Crop 2 Crop 1 Crop 2
Private
optimum 23 37 129.5 153.0 - - 4863 4762
Social
optimum 27 33 122.9 141.5 0.0086 0.0081 4787 4663
Figure 7. Private profits and social returns.
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Table 6 summarises the general economic and environmental features of the
private market solution and the social optimum in terms of total short-run profits,
total nitrogen runoffs, total number of floral species, the Shannon Diversity In-
dex (SHDI), and social welfare (SW).
As Table 6 shows, the private market solution in the absence of taxes and sub-
sidies yields higher private profits, but also higher runoffs and a lower value
for SHDI. In the absence of a buffer strip subsidy the optimal level of buffer
strips and thus the estimate of floral species richness in buffer strip areas is
zero.16 Consequently, social welfare is lower in this solution compared to the
social optimum. The socially optimal solution produces lower private profits
because of the internalisation of negative and positive externalities associated
with runoffs and diversity. The SHDI increases mainly due to the increased
number of patch types through the emergence of buffer strip areas. The buffer
strip areas are endowed with 75 floral species. Social welfare is FIM 13,321
higher in this solution than in the private optimum, giving FIM 222 as the dif-
ference per hectare.
Figure 8 summarises the private optimum in terms of the analysed commodity
and non-commodity outputs and the resulting level of social welfare. The pri-
vate optimum is presented against the benchmark of the social optimum, which
is indexed to 100.
Due to uncertainty related to marginal social benefits and costs of non-com-
modity outputs a sensitivity analysis relating to the marginal damage of runoffs
has been conducted. Both a decrease of 30% (from FIM 9.5 to FIM 6.65) and
an increase of 30% (from FIM 9.5 to FIM 12.35) in the runoff damage estimate
were examined in order to check the robustness of the benchmark case of so-
cial optimum. When the damage estimate was decreased by 30%, the crossing
point, that is, the critical land quality for social returns decreases from 28 to
27, and thus one hectare more is allocated for crop 2 which is more intensive in
Table 6. Economic, environmental and social welfare outcomes under alterna-
tive solutions.
Farmer’s Runoffs, Species SHDI SW
 profits, FIM  kg richness
Private solution 176 481 1375 - 0.67 163 418
Social optimum 174 562 1235 75 0.74 176 739
16It should be noted that this estimate only concerns buffer strip areas. Field boundaries do
support floral species even in the private solution, but they are excluded from this analysis
because they remain unchanged in all solutions.69
fertilizer use and has smaller buffer strips than crop 1. When the damage esti-
mate is increased by 30%  the critical land quality increases from 28 to 29
indicating that 1 one hectare more is allocated for crop 1 which is less fertilizer
intensive and has larger buffer strips than crop 2. Thus, these results follow the
logic of the analytical model and show that the benchmark case of the social
optimum is reasonably robust to changes in the valuation estimate.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter an analytical framework was developed for analysing
multifunctional agriculture as the joint production of a number of commodity
and non-commodity outputs. The core of the framework was Lichtenberg’s
(1989) model of agricultural production with an endogenous input and land
allocation choice for two alternative crops, augmented by a description of cer-
tain non-commodity outputs of agriculture. Of the non-commodity outputs the
study focused on agrobiodiversity, landscape diversity, and nutrient runoffs.
Whereas the two former ones represent public good aspects of agriculture, the
latter one represents its negative externalities.
Figure 8. Indicators of multifunctional outputs in the private solution against the
benchmark of the social optimum, which is indexed to 100.
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The privately optimal land allocation and choice of inputs were solved and com-
pared to the corresponding social optimum. The private optimum results in a
higher fertilizer use and smaller size of buffer strips than the socially optimal
solution. When compared to the private optimum, the socially optimal land
allocation, which is determined also by the marginal valuation of the diversity
benefits and runoff damages, shifts more land to crop 1, which uses fertilizers
less intensively, has larger buffer strips and thus produces a higher level of
diversity.
In the numerical application of the analytical model the private and social op-
tima in the absence of taxes and subsidies were solved, showing that the pri-
vate solution leads to excessive use of fertilizer, sub-optimal use of buffer
strips, and an excessive amount of land devoted to the production of crop 2.71
4 Policy design: Uniform and differentiated
policy instruments
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 the private solution was compared to the socially optimal way of
producing both commodity and non-commodity outputs. The conclusion was
that correcting the privately optimal use of inputs and land allocation to reflect
socially optimal multifunctional agriculture requires an appropriate use of
policy instruments. Thus, the present chapter examines the optimal use of two
instruments, a fertilizer tax and a buffer strip subsidy, to guide the private solu-
tion towards the social optimum. The choice of the socially optimal fertilizer
tax and buffer strip subsidy rates requires that, when maximising the social
welfare function, the government knows how farmers react to the tax and sub-
sidy. This reaction is given by the comparative static effects of the basic levels
of tax and subsidy on the use of inputs and land allocation. These were already
provided in Chapter 3, equations (3.10) and (3.19).
Another question to be studied is whether it is optimal to use uniform or differ-
entiated policy instruments. In the case of differentiated instruments, the tax
and subsidy rates are differentiated according to the crop and parcel. Hence,
the policy incentives are fine-tuned with respect to heterogeneous land quality
conditions. With uniform instruments this is not the case, but a constant per-
unit tax on fertilizer and a constant subsidy for buffer strips are implemented.
Given the benchmark of socially optimal multifunctional agriculture which was
determined in chapter 3, the socially optimal rates of the policy instruments are
solved in the parametric application of the analytical model. The optimal in-
strument rates are solved from the command optimum to reflect the magnitude
of positive and negative externalities per parcel.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Chapter 4.2.1 shortly recalls the
private optimum in the presence of basic levels of agri-environmental policy
instruments. The characteristics of the first-best policy instruments are exam-
ined in Chapter 4.2.2. Chapter 4.2.3 extends the theoretical analysis by consid-
ering the modifications for the optimal level of instruments if the government
is not free to choose its tax/subsidy policy but has to take into account how the
net support to agriculture affects budget revenue and thereby general tax level
in economy. Numerical solutions under differentiated and uniform instruments
are provided in Chapter 4.3 on the basis of the procedure developed in Chapter
4.2.2. The main conclusions are summarised briefly in Chapter 4.4.72
4.2 Optimal level of fertilizer tax and buffer strip
subsidy
4.2.1 Comparative statics of fertilizer tax and buffer strip
subsidy
Let us recall that the first-order conditions for the farmer’s private optimum in
the presence of a basic level of fertilizer tax and a basic level of buffer strip
subsidy are  0 = − =
∗ c f p
i
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the marginal product of input use equals their respective costs. The optimal
fertilizer intensity and buffer strip size differ in every parcel since the produc-
tivity of each parcel differs along with q. Moreover, for a given fertilizer tax
and buffer strip subsidy rate, the use of fertilizer is greater and the size of the
buffer strip is smaller for the crop that is grown on higher quality parcels.
Hence, with regard to agri-environmental policy instruments we have the re-
sult that for internally homogenous parcels, a higher fertilizer tax decreases
fertilizer intensity and increases the size of the buffer strips, and a higher buffer
strip subsidy increases the size of the buffer strips, but does not affect fertilizer
intensity (see equation (3.10) and Appendix 1). Another point to be borne in
mind is the comparative static effects of the policy instruments on land alloca-
tion (equation (3.19)): both instruments shift land into the production of the
less fertilizer-intensive crop 1.
4.2.2 Characteristics of the first-best policy instruments
Let us recall the optimality conditions (3.23a) and (3.23b) from Chapter 3.3.2
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These conditions define the first-best policy instruments for multifunctional
agriculture. The first-best policy includes the combination of a tax on fertiliz-
ers to account for the runoff damages and reduced agrobiodiversity benefits
caused by fertilizer use, and a buffer strip subsidy to encourage the establish-
ment of buffer strip areas to reduce runoff damages and increase agro-
biodiversity benefits.73
The fertilizer tax is a unit tax and one can conclude from (3.23a) that the level of
the optimal fertilizer tax depends on the marginal damage of runoff (which is
equal over all parcels) and the marginal runoffs from fertilizer use in each par-
cel. It is then clear that the optimal tax will vary over land quality, because
marginal runoffs vary over land quality through variations in li and mi. This
means that the fertilizer tax has to be differentiated with respect to parcels and
crops. The tax rate should be higher on parcels with higher land quality, since
marginal runoffs are greater there due to higher fertilizer intensity and smaller
buffer strips. Taking into account the last term in (3.23a), the marginal effect
on agrobiodiversity does not change this feature but only tends to increase the
tax rate over all parcels. Now the optimal differentiated fertilizer tax  can be
expressed as the product of a basic tax level, t, common to both crops, and crop
and parcel specific coefficient, γ ,  t
j
i
j
i γ ζ = , where j refers to parcels and i to
crops. The after-tax price of the fertilizer is thus  ) 1 (
* j
i c c ζ + = .
Similar reasoning also holds for the buffer strip subsidy. From (3.23b) one can
conclude that the subsidy rate depends on the marginal effect of the buffer strip
on agrobiodiversity (the last term), as well as on the value of the marginal
runoff reduction (the second last term). Note that the marginal effect on
agrobiodiversity is constant over parcels, while the marginal effect on runoffs
varies. The buffer strip subsidy also varies across parcels and crops, because
i l  and  i m  do so. Moreover, the optimal buffer strip subsidy must be decreasing
in m. This reflects the decreasing ability of wider buffer strips to further reduce
runoffs and increase species diversity. Now the optimal differentiated buffer
strip subsidy can be specified as  i i
j
i i m m m b ) ( ) ( 2
1 λ λ κ − = , where λ  is the
basic level and κ  is the crop and parcel specific coefficient. The marginal
subsidy is  ) 1 ( ) ( i
j
i i m m b − = ′ λ κ .
Hence, these findings can be collected in
Proposition 2. The promotion of multifunctional agriculture under heteroge-
neous land quality requires the combined use of differentiated instruments to
achieve the first-best solution:
i) a fertilizer tax that equalizes the value of marginal product of
fertilizer over its unit price to the marginal runoff damage and
marginal runoffs of fertilizer in each parcel, as well as its mar-
ginal effect on agrobiodiversity.
ii) a buffer strip subsidy that equalizes the net loss of income
due to decreased production to marginal reductions in run-
off damages and marginal increase in diversity benefits.74
This Proposition is in line with Lichtenberg (2000), which points out in a differ-
ent setting that, in the presence of heterogeneous land quality, it will be socially
optimal to use differentiated instruments if environmental quality depends on
land quality. The requirement for the use of differentiated instruments in our
case arises from the fact that the non-commodity outputs indirectly depend on
land quality through the size of the buffer strips and the amount of fertilizer
used.
Uniform policy instruments that are undifferentiated with respect to land quality
fail to give the right incentives at both the intensive (input use) and extensive
(land allocation) margins in this case (for a further discussion on uniform versus
differentiated instruments see e.g. Lichtenberg 2000). It should be noted, how-
ever, that uniform instruments can also be optimal with heterogeneous land qual-
ity. In our case, a uniform fertilizer tax would be optimal if nutrient runoffs
depended only on the total fertilizer use, and not (even indirectly) on land qual-
ity.
However, the implementation of differentiated instruments may be difficult
and costly to administer in practice. For instance, the implementation of differ-
ential fertilizer taxes at the point of sale would hardly be feasible as the same
fertilizer formulations are used for different crops and under heterogeneous
conditions (see e.g.  Lichtenberg  2000). Therefore, societies often have to
search for second-best solutions, such as uniform policy instruments.
The procedure developed here will be used to solve the differentiated rates of
the policy instruments in the numerical solutions in Chapter 4.3. Before that,
however, a short digression is taken to analyse how government budget rev-
enue considerations affect the optimal level of the instruments.
4.2.3 Optimal instruments and net support to agriculture
In Chapter 4.2.2 the first-best instruments for multifunctional agriculture were
characterised. The optimal instrument levels were derived by implicitly assum-
ing that the government can freely choose its multifunctional tax/subsidy policy
without any budget revenue requirements. This is not always the case as the
government has to run, at least in the long run, a balanced budget. Thus, this
section analyses how the optimal levels of the instruments are modified when
net support to agriculture affects government budget revenue requirements and
thereby general tax level in economy. Simplest way to postulate these effects is
through consumers’ income tax rate which is affected by net support to agricul-
ture.
To introduce the consumers’ surplus it is assumed that the preferences of the
representative consumer define an additively separable, quasi-linear utility func-75
tion. Denoting the consumption of crops by  1 Y  and  2 Y , and the consumer’s
money income by I, the indirect utility function is expressed as
)) ( ( )) ( ( )) , ( 1 ( 2 2 2 1 1 1 Y p u Y p u I t U + + − =
∗ λ ς , where  ) ( i i Y p  is the demand
for both crops (solved from the constrained utility maximization problem), and
the term 		 captures the effects of the multifunctional tax/subsidy
policy on the income tax level of the economy.17 The dependence of the in-
come tax rate on the net support to multifunctional agriculture reflects the fact
that the choice of multifunctional tax and subsidy policy affects the govern-
ment’s budget and thus the needs to finance it. This effect is described through
the representative consumer’s income tax rate, which is increasing in the buffer
strip subsidy and decreasing in the fertilizer tax. The producers’ surplus is de-
fined by an indirect profit function in the presence of a fertilizer tax and a
buffer strip subsidy.18
The government chooses the basic levels of fertilizer tax and buffer strip sub-
sidy so as to maximise
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The following first-order conditions characterise the optimal fertilizer tax and
buffer strip subsidy:
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17The use of quasi-linear utility function is convenient, because it implies that the income ef-
fect is zero and allows one to focus on the substitution effects only. Quasi-linear utility func-
tion is widely used in the public economics and in environmental economics (see e.g.
Lichtenberg 2000, and Cornes and Sandler 1996 for more general discussion).
18This follows the conventional approach in public economics (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini
1990). The optimal fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy are solved as a Stackelberg game
between the farmer and the government. The government acts as a Stackelberg leader, an-
nounces its agri-environmental tax and subsidy policy and commits itself credibly to it. The
farmer then chooses his use of inputs and land allocation.76
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According to (4.2a), the optimal fertilizer tax rate is found by equating the direct
economic loss of the farmer to the marginal benefits from runoff reduction and
improvement in diversity, as well as to the lower income taxation of consumers.
Looking more closely at the effects of tax on diversity, we can see that, while
agrobiodiversity improves, landscape diversity may decrease.
The optimal buffer strip subsidy is set so as to equalise the disutility from higher
income taxation to the sum of the direct economic gain to the farmer and the
marginal benefit from runoff reduction and diversity promotion. While the run-
off unambiguously decreases, the effect on diversity is ambiguous, because
landscape diversity may or may not improve.
These optimality conditions illustrate well the complexities involved in the
policy design for multifunctional agriculture. Because both input intensity and
land allocation are endogenous in this case, their changes may easily counter-
affect each other, as is shown in both conditions. Moreover, consumers must
be willing to pay for agricultural multifunctionality.19
19Allowing for endogenous crop prices will not change these results much. The price effects of
the fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy counter-affect their direct effects, which implies
higher runoff damages and lower diversity. Therefore, the optimal rates of the policy instru-
ments are higher than under exogenous prices.77
To sum up, we have
Corollary.  Accounting for the effects of net support to agriculture for
budget revenue requirements and thereby general tax level in economy
modifies the first-best policy instruments: the basic level of fertilizer tax
increases and the basic level of buffer strip subsidy decreases.
On the basis of Chapter 4.2.2 we now turn to solving the socially optimal rates
of the policy instruments in the parametric application of the analytical model.
4.3 Numerical solutions
In Chapter 3 the basic features of socially optimal multifunctional agriculture
were determined based on Finnish data. Using the socially optimal provision
of commodity and non-commodity outputs as the benchmark the optimal ferti-
lizer tax (nitrogen tax) and buffer strip subsidy rates that can sustain this
optimality can now be designed. Thus, the command optimum allows us to
define the rates for a differentiated fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy for
each parcel so as to maximise the target function in equation (3.22). Two alter-
native cases of uniform agri-environmental policy will also be analysed. In the
first case (semi-uniform instruments) the agri-environmental policy instruments
are crop-specific but uniform with respect to parcel and, thus, land quality. In
the second case (uniform instruments) the instruments are uniform with re-
spect to both the crop and parcel.
The farmer’s short-run profits, a parametric version of (3.3), per parcel for
crop i in the presence of a fertilizer tax and a buffer strip subsidy are given by
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wherei  and  i ω  define the non-linear, decreasing buffer strip subsidy pay-
ment, and  ai and 
i are defined by (3.26).
The solution technique is as follows (see Appendix 5 for sample equations of
the calibrated model). First, the first-order conditions from equations (A5.3a)
and (A5.3b) in Appendix 5 are taken with respect to fertilizer use and buffer
strips. Secondly, the socially optimal input use in each parcel is inserted into
the first-order conditions, and the optimal fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy
are solved in each parcel for both crops.
As the analytical model suggests, the first-best policy consists of 60 pairs of
policy instruments that are differentiated with respect to both the crop and par-
cel.78
In the case of semi-uniform instruments, in order to have an interior solution for
buffer strips also in the highest quality parcels, the optimal quadruple of instru-
ments have been solved for the last parcel, which in our case is the 60th hectare.
This yields the crop-specific instruments that are uniform with respect to par-
cels. Solving the optimal level of the policy instruments for the parcel with the
highest land quality means that the marginal revenue of buffer strips is too high
at lower quality parcels, resulting in too large buffer strips from the social point
of view. The optimal levels of the instruments for the last parcel are as follows:
the fertilizer tax is 23.6% for crop 1 and 27.3% for crop 2, and the buffer strip
subsidy is FIM 2,810 for crop 1 and FIM 2,957 for crop 2.
In the case of uniform instruments, a fertilizer tax of 27.3% and a buffer strip
subsidy of FIM 2,957 are applied for both crops in each parcel. Thus, the in-
struments are determined on the basis of the most profitable crop (crop 2) at
the highest possible land quality.
The results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. For comparison, the results of the
private and social optimum in the absence of intervention from Chapter 3 are
also given. Appendix 3 provides some details of the numerical solutions for
selected parcels. Table 7 presents the land allocation, average use of inputs and
average production per hectare under alternative solutions.
Table 7 shows that the differentiated instruments result in exactly the same land
allocation and input use as the social optimum. Semi-uniform instruments, that
is, instruments that are uniform with respect to land quality but differentiated
between crops, allocate more land into the production of crop 1. This shift in
Table 7. Land allocation, average input use and average production under al-
ternative solutions.
Land allocation, Nitrogen use, Buffer strip size, Production,
ha kg ha kg/ha
Crop 1 Crop 2 Crop 1 Crop 2 Crop 1 Crop 2 Crop 1 Crop 2
Private
optimum 23 37 129.5 153.0 - - 4863 4762
Social
optimum 27 33 122.9 141.5 0.0086 0.0081 4787 4663
Differentiated
instruments 27 33 122.9 141.5 0.0086 0.0081 4787 4664
Semi-uniform
instruments 30 30 115.7 136.8 0.0670 0.0407 4517 4529
Uniform
instruments 27 33 107.7 136.1 0.1253 0.0455 4217 449079
land allocation is mainly caused by the fact that the amount of the buffer strip
subsidy is determined on the basis of the highest land quality. As a result, the
subsidy overcompensates the farmer for the establishment of buffer strips in
low quality parcels and, as the analytical model predicts, increases the relative
profitability of crop 1. The high marginal revenue for establishing buffer strips
results in larger buffer strips for both crops and thus in lower fertilizer use and
production per parcel than was the case under differentiated policy instruments.
Uniform instruments, which are uniform with respect to both land quality and
crop, again result in the socially optimal land allocation. The difference in land
allocation compared to the semi-uniform instruments is mainly due to the ap-
plication of a higher fertilizer tax rate for crop 1, which shifts more land into
the production of crop 2. However, the average buffer strip size increases for
both crops, causing fertilizer use and production per parcel to be lower than
under semi-uniform instruments. This means that average input use and pro-
duction are further away from the social optimum than in the case of semi-
uniform instruments.
Table 8 presents the total short-run profits, total nitrogen runoffs, total number
of floral species, Shannon Diversity Index (SHDI), and social welfare (SW)
under alternative solutions.
As the second and third row in Table 8 show, differentiated instruments yield
the social optimum. The only difference between these two solutions concerns
profits that are lower under differentiated first-best instruments than under the
command optimum. The average nitrogen tax rate is 23.5% for crop 1 and
27.2% for crop 2, and the resulting average cost increase per hectare is FIM
172.1 and FIM 229.3, respectively. The average buffer strip subsidy is FIM
22.8 for crop 1 and FIM 64.9 for crop 2 (see Appendix 3 for details). Thus, the
first-best instruments result in negative net support (subsidy less tax) for the
Table 8. Economic, environmental and social welfare outcomes under alterna-
tive solutions.
Farmer’s Runoffs, Species SHDI SW
 profits, FIM  kg richness
Private solution 176 481 1375 - 0.67 163 418
Private optimum 176 481 1375 - 0.67 163 418
Social optimum 174 562 1235 75 0.74 176 739
Differentiated instruments 164 415 1235 75 0.74 176 739
Semi-uniform  instruments 164 041 1039 90 0.90 172 900
Uniform  instruments 163 726 947 93 0.96 169 77180
farmer and, accordingly, in decreased profits. The total amount of the negative
net support is FIM 10,153, or FIM 169 per hectare.
Semi-uniform instruments result in even lower private profits than differentiated
instruments. This is mainly due to the higher share of buffer strips and the result-
ing lower total production. Although semi-uniform instruments are stronger than
differentiated ones in the provision of environmental non-commodity outputs,
social welfare nevertheless decreases as commodity production is sub-optimal
from the societal viewpoint. In other words, semi-uniform instruments result in
the overprovision of non-commodity outputs and undersupply of commodity out-
puts. In this case as well the net support is negative, amounting to FIM 2,584
(FIM 43 per hectare).
The phenomenon described above is even stronger in the case of uniform policy
instruments. The provision of environmental non-commodity outputs is further
strengthened but, as the total commodity production is further reduced, so is
the total social welfare. Although the net support is now positive, amounting to
Figure 9. Indicators of multifunctional outputs in the first-best and second-best
policy solutions against the benchmark of the social optimum, which is indexed
to 100.
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FIM 1,649 or FIM 27.5 per hectare, due to the reductions in production the
farmer’s profits are lower than under differentiated or semi-uniform instruments.
The reduction in social welfare compared to the first-best instruments is FIM
3,839 (FIM 64 per hectare) with semi-uniform instruments and FIM 6,968
(FIM 116 per hectare) with uniform instruments.
Figure 9 summarises the first-best and second-best policy instruments in terms
of the analysed commodity and non-commodity outputs and the resulting level
of social welfare. The policy solutions are presented against the benchmark of
the social optimum, which is indexed to 100.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter was concerned with the optimal use of a fertilizer tax and buffer
strip subsidy to guide the farmer’s private solution towards the socially opti-
mal way of producing commodity and non-commodity outputs. The optimal
fertilizer tax depends on the marginal runoff from fertilizer use and its mar-
ginal damage, as well as on the marginal effect of fertilizer use on agro-
biodiversity. The optimal buffer strip subsidy depends on the marginal runoff
reduction achieved and its marginal value, as well as on the marginal effect of
buffer strips on agrobiodiversity. All these factors are constant over parcels
except the marginal runoffs from fertilizer use and marginal runoff reduction
from buffer strips. These vary over land quality because of variations in ferti-
lizer intensity and buffer strip width, and make the optimal fertilizer tax and
buffer strip subsidy vary over parcels and crops as well. Thus, the promotion of
multifunctional agriculture under heterogeneous land quality requires the com-
bined use of differentiated instruments to achieve the first-best solution. Tak-
ing into account net support to agriculture modifies the first-best instruments
so that the basic level of fertilizer tax increases and the basic level of buffer
strip subsidy decreases.
In the numerical application the differentiated first-best tax rates and subsidy
levels were solved, yielding 60 pairs of crop- and parcel-specific fertilizer taxes
and buffer strip subsidies. For comparison, uniform policy instruments were
also applied. The social welfare difference between the first-best differentiated
instruments and second-best uniform instruments is FIM 64 (that is, 2.17%) per
hectare in the case of semi-uniform instruments and FIM 116 per hectare in the
case of fully uniform instruments.
It is worth noting, however, that in practice differentiated instruments are un-
likely to be specified for every unit of land. Rather, land would be classified into
several groups according to agricultural productivity or environmental sensitivity
and policy  instruments would be differentiated between these groups.82
5 Income support measures and
multifunctionality
5.1 Introduction
As already noted, the concept of multifunctionality and its use as a basis for
practical policy-making has raised conflicting views among the WTO members.
The proponents of multifunctionality fear that further reductions and constraints
on domestic agricultural support would reduce their ability to pursue non-com-
modity objectives. This is opposed by, for instance, countries in the Cairns Group,
who argue that multifunctionality is used as a pretext for maintaining high levels
of production-related and trade-distorting agricultural support.20
Consequently, no consensus on the appropriate policy response for addressing
non-commodity outputs has been reached. For the Cairns Group the Green Box
measures, that is, measures such as environmental programmes and decoupled
income support that do not distort production decisions and trade or do so only
minimally, represent effective and universal means for addressing multi-
functionality. Countries with high production costs, however, fear that the Green
Box compatible measures may not be sufficient to sustain and enhance the
multifunctional character of agriculture. Thus, these countries are striving to
expand the Green Box to contain some production-linked support in order to
address multifunctional non-commodity outputs effectively.21
This chapter examines whether various farm income support measures that are
used in the European Union countries, including Finland, promote multifunctional
agriculture. The analytical model in Chapter 3 offers a benchmark for the so-
cially optimal provision of both commodity and non-commodity outputs.
The relative merits of alternative income support measures in promoting multi-
functional outputs will be compared in a parametric model that is based on the
analytical model. The basic income support measures included in the analysis
are producer price support and acreage subsidy. The so-called environmental
cross-compliance measures are also analysed, i.e. measures in which the eligi-
20The Cairns Group includes major agricultural exporters from both developed and developing
countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Uruguay, and South Africa.
21Even though it is the link to the WTO that has raised the issue of multifunctionality and farm
income support to the forefront in the international debate, the present chapter is concerned
with domestic policy design and domestic distortions. Therefore – although domestic policies
do affect production levels and thus trade flows – international trade issues are explicitly
analysed in neither the analytical nor the empirical part of the chapter.83
bility for farm income support is contingent upon the farmer’s undertaking of
environmental activities, such as limiting fertilizer use and establishing buffer
strips. Thus, we mainly adopt the “red ticket approach” to environmental cross-
compliance, where eligibility for agricultural support is made contingent upon a
farmer’s attainment of given environmental standards (for a further discussion
see e.g. Christensen and Rygnestad 2000).
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Chapter 5.2 analyses the private
optimum in the presence of income support measures. Chapter 5.3 provides the
numerical solutions for alternative farm income support measures and environ-
mental cross-compliance mechanisms in promoting multifunctional outputs by
using Finnish data against the benchmark of socially optimal multifunctional ag-
riculture. The main conclusions are summarised in Chapter 5.4.
5.2 Private optimum in the presence of income
support measures
5.2.1 Input use
We start by developing the per parcel short-run profit function under alternative
income support measures. The farmer takes the prices of crops (pi) and ferti-
lizer (c) as given. The government intervenes in agriculture through three policy
instruments. First, it pays a price support  so that the unit price of cereals is
) 1 ( τ + =
∗ p pi . Second, cultivated arable land is entitled to a unit acreage sub-
sidy s, and third, a subsidy,  ) ( i m b , is paid for buffer strip areas. Let us assume
that the buffer strip subsidy is decreasing in the size of the buffer strip, reflecting
the decreasing ability of the buffer strip to further reduce nutrient runoff and
increase species diversity. The parametric version of the concave buffer strip
subsidy is () i i m m λ λ 2
1 − . The farmer’s problem is to choose the inputs,  i l  and
i m  so as to maximise the profit per parcel:
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and require that the value of the marginal product of input use equals their re-
spective costs.
The second-order conditions are given in equations (5.3a) to (5.3d)
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where  is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of the second-order partial
derivatives. Since the principal minors  0 1 < H  and  0 2 > H , the Hessian ma-
trix is negative definite and the solution maximises profit (see e.g. Chiang 1984).
The comparative statics can be solved from the first-order conditions by differ-
entiating them with respect to exogenous parameters and applying the Cramer’s
Rule (see also equations (A4.4a) and (A4.4b) in Appendix 4). The results for
cereal price, fertilizer price, and buffer strip subsidy were already reported in
Chapter 3, but the results for price support and acreage subsidy are new.
The effects of price support are given by (5.4a) and (5.4b)
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and the effects of an acreage subsidy are given in equations (5.5a) and (5.5b)
(5.5a) 0 =
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The comparative statics of the model are condensed to (see also Appendix 4 for
details)85
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Hence, as regards pure income support measures we have
Result 3.  Producer price support increases fertilizer intensity and de-
creases the size of buffer strips. Acreage subsidy does not affect fertilizer
intensity but decreases the size of the buffer strips.
5.2.2 Land allocation
The farmer maximises the sum of restricted profit functions 
∗
i π , i = 1,2 by
allocating his land between both crops, that is,
[] ∫ − +
∗ ∗
1
0
1 2 1 1
) (
) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( max
1
dq q g q L q L
q L
π π . The first-order condition for the op-
timal land allocation is
(5.7) 0 ) , , , , , ( ) , , , , , ( 2 2 1 1 ≤ −
∗ ∗ λ τ π λ τ π s c p q s c p q
As in Chapter 3, this first-order condition leads to a corner solution for every
homogenous parcel in the given acreage with differential land quality. Thus, if
) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 q q
∗ ∗ < > π π  then all land of quality q is allocated for crop 1 (crop 2).
However, by assumption the restricted profits are higher for crop 1 in lower
quality parcels whereas in the highest land quality
) , , , , , 1 ( ) , , , , , 1 ( 1 1 2 2 λ τ π λ τ π s c p s c p
∗ ∗ >  they are  higher for crop 2, and re-
stricted profits as a function of land quality increases more rapidly for crop 2 for
all land of quality q, that is 
1 2
q q π π > . These assumptions ensure that there is a
single unique q1 and each crop will be cultivated on a unique, compact range of
land qualities.
The comparative statics of the exogenous parameters on land allocation can be
solved as follows. To solve for 
∂θ
∂ 1 q
, equation (5.7) which defines the critical
value q1 is totally differentiated to get
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From equation (5.8) an appropriate expression for each 
∂θ
∂ 1 q
 can be developed.
Now the effects of uniform price support and acreage subsidy on land allocation
between the crops are as follows.
The effects of uniform price support on land allocation are
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The effects of uniform acreage subsidy are
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The comparative static effects of the exogenous parameters on land allocation
are summarised in (5.11)
(5.11) ) , , , , , ( 2 1 1 1
+ − − + − +
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= λ τ s c p p L L
With regard to farm income support measures we have
Result 4. Producer price support and acreage subsidy shift land into the
production of the more fertilizer-intensive crop 2.87
5.3 Numerical solutions
Given the benchmark of socially optimal multifunctional agriculture established
in Chapter 3, this chapter focuses on alternative income support measures and
environmental cross-compliance mechanisms in a numerical application of the
analytical model. Using Finnish data, the relative efficiency of various income
support measures and cross-compliance mechanisms in promoting
multifunctional outputs is compared in terms of input use, land allocation, pro-
duction, short-run profits, nitrogen runoffs, and diversity. For the latter two
measures are offered, floral species richness which proxies agrobiodiversity,
and the Shannon Diversity Index which captures landscape diversity . Moreo-
ver, government budget outlays and social welfare under alternative policies are
reported.22
The representative farmer’s short-run profits per parcel for crop i in the pres-
ence of income support measures are given by a parametric version of (5.1):
(5.12)  [ ] i i i i i i i i i i i i
i m m m s l m c l l a m p ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
1 2 λ λ β α π − + − + − − + + − =
∗
for  i = 1,2
Six alternative policies involving income support are compared to the private
optimum in the absence of government intervention as well as to the socially
optimal multifunctional agriculture determined by the command optimum. The
alternative income support measures and cross-compliance mechanisms ana-
lysed are listed below. Policies 5 and 6 reflect actual agricultural and agri-envi-
ronmental policies for cereals in Southern Finland in 1999.
– In policy 1 (pure acreage subsidy), an acreage subsidy (CAP
compensation payment) of FIM 1,100/ha is paid.
– Policy 2 (pure price support) includes price support of FIM
0.39/kg for crop 1 (barley) and FIM 0.44/kg for crop 2 (wheat),
which corresponds to EU intervention prices before the CAP
reform in 1992.
– Policy 3 (acreage subsidy with cross-compliance) consists
of an acreage subsidy of FIM 1,100/ha with cross-compliance,
22Social welfare calculations for these alternative policy solutions assume that these support
payments are financed wholly by Finnish government. In practice, however, CAP compensa-
tion payments are financed by the EU, and agri-environmental support is also partly financed
by the EU. Thus, policy solutions involving these transfers would be ”artificially” high in
terms of social welfare if we do not assume that payments are totally paid by Finnish govern-
ment. This assumption applies for price support as well.88
that is, with a mandatory 3-metre-wide buffer strip and nitrogen
fertilizer limits of 90 kg/ha for crop 1 and 100 kg/ha for crop 2.
– Policy 4 (price support with cross-compliance) consists of
price support of FIM 0.39/kg for crop 1 (barley) and FIM 0.44/
kg for crop 2 (wheat) with cross-compliance, that is, with a
mandatory 3-metre-wide buffer strip and nitrogen fertilizer lim-
its of 90 kg/ha for crop 1 and 100 kg/ha for crop 2.
– Policy 5 (actual policy I) includes an acreage subsidy of FIM
1,100/ha and agri-environmental support of FIM 1053/ha with
cross-compliance. The environmental conditions attached to the
agri-environmental support are a mandatory 3-metre-wide
buffer strip and nitrogen fertilizer limits of 90 kg/ha for crop 1
and 100 kg/ha for crop 2. In addition, a buffer zone subsidy of
FIM 3,610/ha is available for those who establish wider buffer
strips on a voluntary basis (minimum width 15 m).
– Policy 6 (actual policy II) is otherwise similar to policy 5 but
the buffer zone subsidy is not available.
Table 9 reports the additional parameter values related to these policies. (See
also Table 4 for a listing of other parameters in the model).
Table 10 reports the land allocation, average input use and average production,
and Table 11 the effects of alternative policies on short-run profits, nitrogen
runoffs, floral species richness, and the Shannon Diversity Index (SHDI). Note
that, instead of the production per hectare for each crop, the total production is
given in order to show how alternative income support policies and cross-com-
pliance mechanisms affect the level of production.
Table 9. Additional parameter values (see also Table 4).
Parameter Symbol Value
Price of barley with support p1 FIM 1.12/kg
Price of barley without support p1 FIM 0.73/kg
Price of wheat with support p2 FIM 1.27/kg
Price of wheat without support p2 FIM 0.83/kg
Buffer zone subsidy  FIM 3610/ha
Acreage subsidy for crop 1 s1 FIM 1100/ha
Acreage subsidy for crop 2 s2 FIM 1100/ha
Note: Prices are from 1999 (FIM 1= 0.1682 euro).89
In the first policy alternative the farmer is entitled to a unit acreage subsidy of
FIM 1,100 per hectare. The effects of the acreage subsidy closely correspond
to the private market solution, since the use of inputs and land allocation are
exactly the same in these two solutions; only the farmer’s profits are higher
under policy 1 due to the subsidy. Thus, with regard to promoting multifunctional
outputs, the acreage subsidy results in exactly the same solution as the case
where the government does not intervene in agriculture.
Table 11. Economic and environmental outcomes under alternative solutions.
Farmer’s profits, Runoffs, Species SHDI
 FIM  kg   richness
Private optimum 176 481 1375 - 0.67
Social optimum 174 562 1235 75 0.74
Pure acreage subsidy 242 481 1375 - 0.67
Pure price support 298 388 1536 - 0.60
Acreage subsidy with
cross-compliance 228 483 924 73 0.72
Price support with
cross-compliance 267 122 927 73 0.70
Actual policy I 268 174 312 104 1.23
Actual policy II 291  284 924 73 0.72
Table 10. Land allocation, average input use and total production under alterna-
tive solutions.
Land allocation, Nitrogen use, Buffer strip size, Production,
ha kg ha kg
Crop 1Crop 2 Crop 1 Crop 2 Crop 1 Crop 2
Private optimum 23 37 129.5 153.0 - - 288 038
Social optimum 27 33 122.9 141.5 0.00868 0.0081 283 134
Pure acreage subsidy 23 37 129.5 153.0 - - 288 038
Pure price support 17 43 137.6 166.2 - - 289 575
Acreage subsidy with
cross-compliance 25 35 89.5 99.4 0.00600 0.00600 250 025
Price support with
cross-compliance 23 37 89.5 99.4 0.00600 0.00600 249 094
Actual policy I 25 35 64.5 78.5 0.28300 0.21530 190 250
Actual policy II 25 35 89.5 99.4 0.00600 0.00600 250 02590
Under the second policy, producer price support is paid for both crops. The
price support shifts land into the production of the more profitable and fertilizer-
intensive crop, which is crop 2 in the model. Of all the alternative policies, price
support results in the highest level of production and short-run profits, but also in
the highest runoffs and the lowest value for diversity. Thus, price support per-
forms even worse than an acreage subsidy in terms of promoting the environ-
mental dimension of multifunctionality.
In the third policy alternative environmental cross-compliance is attached to the
acreage subsidy so that in order to be eligible for the acreage subsidy the farmer
has to establish a mandatory 3-metre-wide buffer strip for all parcels and limit
his nitrogen fertilizer application to 90 kg/ha for crop 1 and 100 kg/ha for crop 2.
The comparison of this solution to the pure acreage subsidy (policy 1) demon-
strates that cross-compliance schemes can provide a sufficient means for ad-
dressing the environmental dimensions of multifunctional agriculture. Produc-
tion and profits are lower than in the case of pure acreage subsidy but environ-
mental outcomes are clearly better.
In the fourth policy solution, in order to be eligible for producer price support the
farmer has to fulfil the same environmental criteria as in policy 3 discussed
above. Profits and production are now clearly lower than under pure price sup-
port. Again, it can be seen that environmental criteria coupled with price support
clearly result in better environmental quality than pure price support. In terms of
environmental outcomes this solution also corresponds closely to the case of
acreage subsidy coupled with environmental cross-compliance (policy 3).
In the case of policy 5, a buffer zone subsidy of FIM 3,610/ha is paid for the
farmer for the establishment of wider buffer strips on a voluntary basis. Specifi-
cally because of the establishment of these wider buffer strips, this solution
results in smaller cultivated area and thus in the lowest level of production.
However, this is the strongest policy in promoting environmental outputs.
Runoffs are clearly lower and agrobiodiversity and landscape diversity clearly
higher than under other policies. Yet, from society’s viewpoint this solution may
be sub-optimal in the sense that the level of production is too low and the level of
environmental outputs is too high compared to the social optimum.
The environmental outcomes of policy 6 are the same as those of the acreage
subsidy coupled with environmental cross-compliance (policy 3). In fact, the
only difference between these two solutions has to do with the farmer’s short-
run profits, which are higher under policy 6 due to agri-environmental support
payments.91
Figure 10. Indicators of multifunctional outputs in two policy solutions including
acreage subsidy against the benchmark of the social optimum, which is indexed
to 100.
Figure 11. Indicators of multifunctional outputs in two policy solutions including
price support against the benchmark of the social optimum, which is indexed to
100.
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Figures 10 to 12 summarise the six policy solutions including income support in
terms of the analysed commodity and non-commodity outputs. The private opti-
mum is presented against the benchmark of the social optimum, which is in-
dexed to 100.
Table 12 reports government budget outlays and social welfare under alterna-
tive policy solutions. It should be noted that in all solutions budget outlays are
assumed to be financed wholly by Finnish government (including price support).
Furthermore,  budget outlays are subtracted from social welfare estimate, since
they are direct transfers from consumers and taxpayers to farmers. Thus, social
welfare estimate proxies domestic distortions related to commodity and non-
commodity outputs of alternative policies against the benchmark of the social
optimum.
It can be seen from Table 12 that actual policy I (with uniform buffer zone
subsidy) results in the lowest level of social welfare although it is the strongest
policy in promoting environmental outputs. This clearly demonstrates the need
for spatial differentiation of the level of policy incentive.
Figure 12. Indicators of multifunctional outputs in two actual policy solutions
including income support against the benchmark of the social optimum, which is
indexed to 100.
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5.4 Conclusions
This chapter studied how well farm income support measures, namely producer
price support and acreage support, as well as some environmental cross-compli-
ance measures promote multifunctional agriculture.
The results show that a pure acreage subsidy as well as pure producer price
support perform poorly in promoting the environmental elements of
multifunctional agriculture. However, the performance of these income support
measures could be greatly improved by incorporating some environmental cross-
compliance mechanisms into them. In other words, eligibility for these types of
support should be tied to some environmental criteria.
From the perspective of trade policy reform, however, there is one caveat in the
analysis presented in this chapter. This has to do with the fact that the model
only includes one extensive margin effect, that is, land allocation between the
two crops. From the viewpoint of trade policy implications it would be neces-
sary to also examine the entry and exit of cultivated land under alternative poli-
cies. This second extensive margin effect may be significant, for example, in a
case where a country has plenty of marginal land under the current subsidy
system, and the introduction of new support payments aimed for promoting non-
commodity outputs would make also this land profitable to cultivate. In such a
case the policies may increase aggregate output, which in turn may affect trade
flows. This may make some of the environmental cross-compliance mecha-
nisms and agri-environmental policies analysed here incompatible with the Green
Box.
Table 12. Government budget outlays and social welfare under alternative solu-
tions.
Budget Social Difference
outlays, welfare,  to social
FIM/ha   FIM/ha optimum/ha
Private optimum - 2724 -222
Social optimum - 2946 -
Pure acreage subsidy 1100 2724 -222
Pure price support 2053 2677 -269
Acreage subsidy with cross-compliance 1093 2794 -152
Price support with cross-compliance 1747 2784 -161
Actual policy I 2508 2216 -730
Actual policy II 2153 2781 -16494
6 Conclusions
6.1 Summary and main findings
Multifunctional agriculture refers to the fact that agriculture produces jointly a
number of commodity and non-commodity outputs, and some of these non-com-
modity outputs exhibit the characteristics of externalities and public goods. Thus,
multifunctionality provides an integrated framework for the simultaneous con-
sideration of multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs.
Multifunctionality constitutes a complex problem from the perspective of policy
design and implementation. Finding out the socially optimal bundle of multiple
commodity and non-commodity outputs involves the identification of the impor-
tant outputs as well as their relative significance, which as such is a challenging
task. Moreover, policies to promote multifunctional agriculture must simultane-
ously address several outputs, commodity and non-commodity ones, which have
tradeoffs and complementarities in their supply. All this is further complicated
by the fact that the heterogeneous conditions under which agriculture operates
create a spatial dimension both in the supply of and demand for non-commodity
outputs. There are spatial differences in productivity and, hence, in the produc-
tion costs of commodity and non-commodity outputs on the supply side, and
spatial valuation differences on the demand side. Finally, there is the practical
problem that the information requirements and related transaction costs for de-
signing and implementing spatially differentiated interventions in order to max-
imise social welfare from optimal bundles of commodity and non-commodity
outputs may be considerable, wherefore governments may be obligated to look
for less effective solutions, which are less information-intensive but may distort
production decisions and thus trade.
The main objective of the present study was to contribute to the understanding
of the implications of multifunctionality for effective agri-environmental policy
design. The main research question addressed was the performance of various
types of policy interventions in achieving the optimal bundle of multifunctional
outputs under heterogeneous conditions.
The scope of the present study was restricted to the environmental dimension of
multifunctionality. Two commodity outputs (crop production and related farm
income) and three environmental non-commodity outputs (nutrient runoffs, land-
scape diversity, and agrobiodiversity) were analysed, taking into account
jointness and heterogeneity in their supply and the externality and public good
aspects in their demand. The analytical sections of the study are generally appli-
cable, but the empirical parameters of the parametric model are specific to Fin-
land.95
A review of the literature relating to the environmental dimension of multi-
functionality (Chapter 2) revealed the fact that formal economic analysis of the
supply of, demand for, or policy design for multifunctionality is relatively recent
and scarce. A number of studies are available but they tend to concentrate on
individual aspects of multifunctionality. A more comprehensive approach to ex-
amining multifunctionality as a whole is only emerging.
The core chapters of the present study examined the optimal provision of multi-
functional outputs without government intervention (Chapter 3), the use of dif-
ferentiated (first-best) and uniform (second-best) policy instruments for pro-
moting multifunctional agriculture (Chapter 4), as well as some “real-life” policy
instruments (Chapter 5).
In Chapter 3 an analytical framework was developed for analysing multi-
functional agriculture as the joint production of a number of commodity and non-
commodity outputs. The privately optimal land allocation and choice of inputs
were solved and compared to the corresponding social optimum. The private
optimum results in a higher fertilizer use and smaller size of buffer strips than
the socially optimal solution. When compared to the private optimum, the so-
cially optimal land allocation, which is determined also by the marginal valuation
of the diversity benefits and runoff damages, shifts more land to crop 1, which
uses fertilizers less intensively, has larger buffer strips and thus produces a
higher level of diversity. In the numerical application of the analytical model the
private and social optima in the absence of taxes and subsidies were solved,
showing that the private solution leads to excessive use of fertilizers, sub-opti-
mal use of buffer strips, and an excessive amount of land devoted to the produc-
tion of crop 2.
Chapter 4 investigated the optimal use of a fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy
to guide the farmer’s private solution towards the socially optimal way of pro-
ducing commodity and non-commodity outputs. The optimal fertilizer tax de-
pends on the marginal runoff from fertilizer use and its marginal damage, as well
as on the marginal effect of fertilizer use on agrobiodiversity. The optimal buffer
strip subsidy depends on the marginal runoff reduction achieved and its marginal
value, as well as on the marginal effect of buffer strips on agrobiodiversity. All
these factors are constant over parcels except the marginal runoffs from ferti-
lizer use and marginal runoff reduction from buffer strips. These vary over land
quality because of variations in fertilizer intensity and buffer strip width, and
make the optimal fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy vary over parcels and
crops as well. Thus, the promotion of multifunctional agriculture under hetero-
geneous land quality requires the combined use of differentiated instruments to
achieve the first-best solution. Taking into account net support to agriculture
modifies the first-best instruments so that the basic level of fertilizer tax in-
creases and the basic level of buffer strip subsidy decreases. In the numerical96
application the differentiated first-best tax rates and subsidy levels were solved,
yielding 60 pairs of crop- and parcel-specific fertilizer taxes and buffer strip
subsidies. For comparison, uniform policy instruments were also applied. The
social welfare difference between the first-best differentiated instruments and
the second-best uniform instruments is FIM 64 per hectare in the case of semi-
uniform instruments and FIM 116 per hectare in the case of fully uniform instru-
ments.
Chapter 5 studied how well farm income support measures, namely producer
price support and acreage support, as well as some environmental cross-compli-
ance measures promote multifunctional agriculture. The results show that pure
acreage subsidy and pure producer price support perform poorly in promoting
the environmental elements of multifunctional agriculture. However, the per-
formance of these income support measures could be greatly improved by in-
corporating some environmental cross-compliance mechanisms into them.
6.2 Policy implications
The study brings out how the design of agri-environmental policies against the
background of multifunctionality differs from the individual treatment of the vari-
ous environmental effects of agriculture. Because of the joint production proc-
ess, the levels of different multifunctional outputs are linked to each other.
Hence, the regulation of one environmental effect necessarily influences the
other environmental effects and agricultural production, as well as other dimen-
sions of multifunctionality. These interactions need to be accounted for when
designing policies inducive to multifunctionality.
Theoretically, first-best policy intervention requires the use of differentiated
policy instruments to account for the heterogeneity in the production conditions,
which causes spatial variation in the supply of both commodity and non-com-
modity outputs. However, the information requirements and related information
costs of such differentiated instruments may be enormous. Hence, although the
performance of policy instruments can be improved through spatial targeting,
the increased administrative costs have to be weighed against the potential gains
in precision. This is one of the reasons why policy instruments that are used in
practice differ from the theoretically optimal ones. Resorting to second-best,
that is, not fully differentiated, policy instruments reduces the administrative
burden but fails to secure the production of the optimal bundle of multifunctional
outputs.
In the international debate on multifunctionality, one of the key issues has to do
with the justification for continued domestic support. Such support, it is argued,
is needed especially in countries where the commodity production itself is un-97
competitive to guarantee the supply of the non-commodity benefits produced by
agriculture. The central question in this context is whether the support can be
linked to commodity production. Perhaps the two most common farm income
support measures, price support and acreage subsidy, perform poorly with re-
spect to the environmental dimension of multifunctionality. Environmental cross-
compliance schemes, on the other hand, can provide sufficient means for pro-
moting multifunctionality even with price support and acreage subsidy. Eligibility
for these types of support should thus be tied to some environmental criteria.
As far as the case of Finland is concerned, it can be stated that there is no need
to establish a new support system dedicated for promoting environmental multi-
functionality. The existing Finnish agri-environmental programme already pro-
vides a good starting point for this purpose. The programme enjoys wide partici-
pation, covering over 90% of farms and 95% of the cultivated area, comprises
all relevant environmental non-commodity outputs, and has an administrative
structure in place. However, the programme would benefit from an explicit con-
sideration of the themes of the present study: jointness, heterogeneity, and the
valuation of externalities and public goods.
6.3 Limitations of the study and suggestions for
further research
The present study is concerned with how heterogeneous conditions should be
taken into account in policy design for environmental multifunctionality. How-
ever, there is also another pervasive feature which affects the agriculture –
environment relationship: uncertainty due to stochastic factors (Lichtenberg
2000). The present study has not touched upon uncertainty. Stochastic factors,
such as weather conditions, do have an important role in the determination of
agricultural commodity production and the associated nutrient runoffs, for ex-
ample. On the other hand, they may play a minor role, if any at all, in the supply
of some other non-commodity outputs like landscape diversity. Heterogeneity,
in turn, may be important in the context of all environmental non-commodity
outputs of agriculture. Therefore, at this stage of research it seemed that ac-
counting for heterogeneity takes priority over uncertainty. But, as the research
on multifunctionality develops, it may be interesting to explore uncertainty as
well.
The same conclusion applies to dynamic aspects. They may be significant in
environmental multifunctionality, but were ignored in the present study. Future
research may examine the possible dynamics of the interdependencies between
commodity and non-commodity outputs.98
Moreover, the model developed here has a fixed amount of land and thus only
includes one extensive margin effect: the land allocation between crops. The
other types of extensive margin effects, that is, changes in the amount of culti-
vated land (entry and exit) under alternative policies and the resulting effects on
aggregate output levels remain uncovered. Yet, these effects are important in
discussions relating to trade policy reform.
In the empirical sections of the present study multifunctionality was valued on
the basis of its individual components. However, it would be interesting to elabo-
rate these results if an estimate on the simultaneous valuation of all environmen-
tal non-commodity outputs were available.
The issue of transaction costs is highlighted in the case of multifunctionality and
heterogeneity because of the very complicated nature of the optimal solutions.
The present study has referred to this problematique several times, but did not
directly incorporate transaction costs into the analysis. Future research should
try to explicitly account for transaction costs and assess their importance in the
face of the multifaceted policy design and implementation problems that are
posed by multifunctionality.
Finally, for reasons explained in Chapter 1.2, the present study covers only the
environmental dimension of multifunctionality. For example, the socio-economic
viability of rural areas was touched only very indirectly through farmers’ in-
come. However, it is in the very nature of multifunctionality that all of its as-
pects should be considered in a simultaneous and integrated manner. Future
research may be able to move towards this goal as a common understanding of
what exactly constitutes multifunctionality develops.99
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Appendix 1 (1/1). Comparative statics for Chapters 3 and 4
Input use
The per parcel profit function of the representative farmer is
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The comparative statics effects of market parameters, that is output and input
prices, can be solved by applying the Cramer’s Rule from
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and the effects of a buffer strip subsidy and a fertilizer tax from
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Appendix 2 (1/1). Input use, profits, and social returns in
selected parcels in the absence of intervention
This Appendix presents some details of the parametric model for selected par-
cels. Land quality q increases from 1 to 60. Input choices are given first, fol-
lowed by profits and social returns. Note that buffer strips are absent in the
private optimum.
Private optimum Social optimum
Fertilizer intensity Fertilizer intensity Buffer strips
q Crop 1 Crop 2 Crop 1 Crop 2 Crop 1 Crop 2
1 129,3476 152,3207 123,8169 142,0883 0,009065 0,010991
5 129,4026 152,4219 123,8665 142,1695 0,008932 0,010573
10 129,4662 152,539 123,924 142,262 0,008776 0,010091
15 129,524 152,6453 123,9765 142,3445 0,008634 0,009655
20 129,5761 152,7411 124,024 142,417 0,008504 0,009264
24 129,6135 152,81 124,0584 142,4678 0,00841 0,008984
25 129,6223 152,8262 124,0665 142,4795 0,008388 0,008919
26 129,6309 152,8419 124,0744 142,4908 0,008366 0,008855
27 129,6392 152,8573 124,0821 142,5017 0,008345 0,008793
28 129,6473 152,8722 124,0896 142,5122 0,008324 0,008733
29 129,6551 152,8866 124,0969 142,5223 0,008304 0,008675
30 129,6628 152,9007 124,104 142,532 0,008284 0,008619
35 129,6974 152,9645 124,1365 142,5745 0,008194 0,008365
40 129,7263 153,0177 124,164 142,607 0,008116 0,008156
45 129,7495 153,0602 124,1865 142,6295 0,008052 0,007993
50 129,7668 153,0922 124,204 142,642 0,008 0,007875
55 129,7784 153,1134 124,2165 142,6445 0,007962 0,007803
60 129,7841 153,1241 124,224 142,637 0,007936 0,007776
Private profits Social returns
q C r o p  1C r o p  2C r o p  1C r o p  2
1 2704,182 2476,553 2729,628 2472,963
5 2733,954 2552,333 2759,056 2547,764
10 2768,7 2641,23 2793,408 2635,56
15 2800,704 2723,65 2825,054 2717,002
20 2829,963 2799,594 2853,992 2792,08
24 2851,396 2855,686 2875,192 2847,553
25 2856,48 2869,061 2880,221 2860,783
26 2861,454 2882,177 2885,141 2873,758
27 2866,318 2895,034 2889,953 2886,478
28 2871,072 2907,631 2894,657 2898,942
29 2875,717 2919,97 2899,252 2911,15
30 2880,252 2932,049 2903,739 2923,103
35 2901,28 2988,56 2924,546 2979,032
40 2919,565 3038,592 2942,641 3028,565
45 2935,105 3082,146 2958,024 3071,699
50 2947,901 3119,221 2970,692 3108,428
55 2957,952 3149,817 2980,647 3138,75
60 2965,259 3173,933 2987,888 3162,662110
Appendix 3 (1/1). Input use, profits, and instruments in
selected parcels under differentiated instruments
This Appendix presents some details of the parametric model for selected par-
cels. Land quality q increases from 1 to 60. Input choices are given first, fol-
lowed by profits and instrument levels.
Differentiated
instruments
Fertilizer intensity Buffer strips Profits
q Crop 1 Crop 2 Crop 1 Crop 2 Crop 1 Crop 2
1 123,8153 142,0886 0,00902 0,011069 2527,406 2337,453
5 123,8657 142,1694 0,008883 0,01057 2556,956 2383,764
10 123,924 142,2626 0,008728 0,010035 2591,445 2453,987
15 123,977 142,3471 0,00859 0,009584 2623,214 2525,802
20 124,0246 142,4228 0,008467 0,0092 2652,263 2594,84
24 124,0589 142,4771 0,00838 0,008955 2673,543 2647,242
25 124,067 142,4898 0,008359 0,008891 2678,591 2659,713
26 124,0748 142,5021 0,008339 0,008825 2683,53 2671,933
27 124,0824 142,5141 0,00832 0,008758 2688,36 2683,902
28 124,0899 142,5258 0,008301 0,008704 2693,082 2695,818
29 124,0971 142,5371 0,008283 0,008652 2697,694 2707,499
30 124,104 142,548 0,008266 0,008598 2702,198 2718,927
35 124,1358 142,5976 0,008186 0,008364 2723,084 2772,753
40 124,1622 142,6384 0,00812 0,008165 2741,25 2820,701
45 124,1833 142,6704 0,008066 0,008001 2756,694 2862,643
50 124,1991 142,6938 0,008025 0,007865 2769,417 2898,464
55 124,2096 142,7084 0,007996 0,007756 2779,418 2928,116
60 124,2148 142,7142 0,007979 0,007672 2786,699 2951,541
Differentiated 
instruments per hectare
Tax-decomp. Subsidy-decomp.
q C r o p  1C r o p  2C r o p  1C r o p  2
1 171,454 224,35 22,90087 120,7402
5 171,6896 225,0393 22,81519 91,56428
10 171,9617 225,8325 22,71702 73,25019
15 172,2092 226,5517 22,629 63,00232
20 172,4321 227,2009 22,55136 56,43477
24 172,5928 227,6664 22,49685 53,05129
25 172,6305 227,7779 22,48429 52,20035
26 172,6672 227,8876 22,47216 51,34724
27 172,703 227,9954 22,46047 50,49189
28 172,7378 228,0978 22,4492 49,87302
29 172,7716 228,1978 22,43837 49,27369
30 172,8045 228,2957 22,42798 48,6734
35 172,9541 228,7445 22,38259 46,24823
40 173,0795 229,1293 22,34826 44,38574
45 173,1806 229,4505 22,32509 42,96163
50 173,2575 229,709 22,31317 41,85312
55 173,3102 229,9051 22,31258 41,01593
60 173,3387 230,0394 22,32335 40,38641111
Appendix 4 (1/1). Comparative statics for Chapter 5
Input use
The per parcel profit function of the representative farmer is
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The comparative statics effects of market parameters, that is output and input
prices, can be solved by applying the Cramer’s Rule from
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and the effects of price support and an acreage subsidy from
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Private optimum
Profit 1:
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Social optimum
Social returns 1:
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First-best instruments
Profits under instruments 1:
(A5.3a)
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Profits under instruments 2:
(A5.3b)
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Appendix 5 (1/1). Sample equations from calibrated model
Note that all these equations refer to the lowest quality parcel q which is the first
parcel. As land quality varies between parcels so will also a (in the first parcel
810 for crop 1 and 803 for crop 2) and  (in the first parcel 52.905 for crop 1
and 35.805 for crop 2) vary between parcels.113
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